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Distinct networks in the forebrain and the midbrain coordinate to control spatial attention. The critical involvement of the superior
colliculus (SC)—the central structure in the midbrain network—in visuospatial attention has been shown by four seminal, published
studies in monkeys (Macaca mulatta) performing multialternative tasks. However, due to the lack of a mechanistic framework for
interpreting behavioral data in such tasks, the nature of the SC’s contribution to attention remains unclear. Here we present and validate
a novel decision framework for analyzing behavioral data inmultialternative attention tasks.We apply this framework to re-examine the
behavioral evidence from these published studies. Our model is a multidimensional extension to signal detection theory that distin-
guishes between two major classes of attentional mechanisms: those that alter the quality of sensory information or “sensitivity,” and
those that alter the selective gating of sensory information or “choice bias.” Model-based simulations andmodel-based analyses of data
from these published studies revealed a converging pattern of results that indicated that choice-bias changes, rather than sensitivity
changes, were the primary outcome of SCmanipulation. Our results suggest that the SC contributes to attentional performance predom-
inantly by generating a spatial choice bias for stimuli at a selected location, and that this bias operates downstream of forebrain mecha-
nisms that enhance sensitivity. The findings lead to a testable mechanistic framework of how the midbrain and forebrain networks
interact to control spatial attention.
Key words: attention mechanisms; behavior; microstimulation and inactivation; midbrain; multialternative decisions; signal-detection
theory
Introduction
Spatial attention is controlled by the coordinated action of two
distinct networks in the brain. One of these, the forebrain atten-
tion network, comprises the prefrontal cortex and the posterior
parietal cortex (Bisley and Goldberg, 2010; Squire et al., 2013).
The contributions of the forebrain network to attention have
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Significance Statement
Attention involves the selection of the most relevant information for differential sensory processing and decision making. While
the mechanisms by which attention alters sensory encoding (sensitivity control) are well studied, the mechanisms by which
attention alters decisional weighting of sensory evidence (choice-bias control) are poorly understood.Here, we introduce amodel
ofmultialternative decisionmaking that distinguishes bias fromsensitivity effects in attention tasks.With ourmodel,we simulate
experimental data from four seminal studies that microstimulated or inactivated a key attention-related midbrain structure, the
superior colliculus (SC). We demonstrate that the experimental effects of SC manipulation are entirely consistent with the SC
controlling attention by changing choice bias, thereby shedding new light on how the brain mediates attention.
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been studied extensively (Bressler et al., 2008; Corbetta et al.,
2008; Corbetta and Shulman, 2011; Noudoost and Moore, 2011;
Soltani et al., 2013). The midbrain attention network comprises
the superior colliculus (SC) and associated tegmental nuclei
(Knudsen, 2011). Much less is known about how the midbrain
network mediates its causal role in controlling spatial attention
(Krauzlis et al., 2013).
By what mechanisms could the midbrain network contribute to
attention control? Signal-detection theory (SDT), a well established
Bayesian framework, distinguishes between two major classes of
mechanismsbywhich sensory information isused inmakingbehav-
ioral decisions during attention: (1) those that alter the quality of the
sensory information (perceptual sensitivity) and (2) those that alter
the selective gating of sensory evidence (choice bias). During spatial
attention, brainnetworks could engage eitherorbothof these classes
of mechanisms to differentially enhance perceptual performance at
the attended location (Shaw, 1980; Sperling andDosher, 1986; Eck-
stein et al., 2009, 2013; Carrasco, 2011).
Four seminal studies have provided converging evidence for a
critical role of the SC, the central node in the midbrain network, in
controlling spatial attention in primates (Cavanaugh and Wurtz,
2004; Mu¨ller et al., 2005; Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010; Ze´non and
Krauzlis, 2012). In each study, manipulations (microstimulation or
inactivation) of space-specific loci within the topographic represen-
tation in the SC resulted in systematic enhancements or impair-
ments of behavioral performance in diverse attention tasks.
However, because of the absence of an adequatemechanistic frame-
work for analyzing and interpreting the behavioral results, none of
these studies was able to identify the nature of the SC’s contribution
to decisionmaking during attention. That is, does the output of the
SC improve the processing of sensory information (e.g., increase
perceptual sensitivity), does it alter the gating of sensory evidence
(e.g., alter spatial choice bias), or both?
Here, we present a multidimensional extension to SDT that
enables us to answer this question. We develop a normative
framework for distinguishing perceptual sensitivity from choice-
bias effects in multialternative decision tasks and demonstrate
why conventional behavioral metrics of sensitivity changes are
not useful in such tasks. We validate the framework by analyzing
avian and primate behavioral data in several multialternative
visuospatial tasks, and show that themodel not only describes but
also accurately predicts behavior in these tasks. We then use this
model to re-examine the behavioral evidence from the aforemen-
tioned studies that investigated the involvement of the SC in
attention (Cavanaugh andWurtz, 2004;Mu¨ller et al., 2005; Love-
joy and Krauzlis, 2010; Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012). We demon-
strate that, when examinedwithin themultidimensional decision
space of our model, through simulations and model fitting, the
reported behavioral effects of SC microstimulation or inactiva-
tion can be accounted for by changes in spatial choice bias alone
without associated changes in sensitivity. The results provide
mechanistic insights into the contribution of the SC to visuospa-
tial selective attention.
Materials andMethods
Animals
Experiments were conducted with three adult (8 months old), female
white-leghorn chickens (Gallus domesticus) and an adult, male macaque
monkey (Macaca mulatta). All procedures were in compliance with the
guidelines of the National Institutes of Health for the care and use of
laboratory animals and were approved by the Institute Animal Care and
Use Committee of Stanford University.
Multialternative detection or change-detectionmodel
development
Themultidimensional signal-detectionmodel [multialternativedetectionor
change-detection (m-ADC) model] developed here describes behavioral
performance inmultialternative decision tasks. Themathematical formula-
tion of the extended model is presented below. A verbal description of the
model and geometric intuition are provided in the initial section of the
Results.
Amodel for optimal detection in multialternative tasks
We derive a signal-detection model for m-ADC tasks involving multiple
stimulus events and a no-stimulus (“catch”) event. Examples of such
tasks are shown in Figure 1A,E.We extend a previous formulation (Srid-
haran et al., 2014b) to derive an optimal decision rule form-ADC tasks in
which sensitivities for the different stimulus contingencies can be signif-
icantly different. Such a formulation is particularly relevant for multi-
alternative attention tasks in which the subject’s sensitivity to stimuli
presented at a location cued for attention could be substantially higher
than that at other locations. In addition, we develop a definition for bias
in this signal-detection framework, and demonstrate its analytical rela-
tionship with “priors” (prior odds ratio) and “payoffs” (relative values of
costs vs benefits).
We develop the model with the example of a multiple (m)-
alternative spatial orientation-change detection task. In this task the
subject is required to report the one location, among several, at which
an orientation change occurred (Fig. 1E; see Fig. 3A). In each trial, the
subject is rewarded for giving a Go response (e.g., saccade) to the
location of change, or for giving a NoGo response (e.g., maintain
fixation) if no change occurred anywhere. Although we have chosen a
specific example, the model is generally applicable to a variety of
m-ADC tasks that involve detecting targets (Fig. 1A) or changes in
one among several stimulus features (colors, shapes, etc.).
We use the following notation for the stimulus events and response
types. X is a multivariate random variable whose ith component, Xi, de-
notes the location of the change on each trial:Xi 1 indicates a change at
location i, and Xi 0, otherwise. Y is a random variable that denotes the
type of response on each trial: Y i indicates a Go response to location i
and Y 0 indicates a NoGo response. In each trial of the m-ADC task, a
change can occur at one of the many locations (iXi 1, “change” trial)
or not at all (iXi 0, “catch” trial), and nomore than one change event
can occur on each trial.
Model formulation
We developed a latent variable formulation to model behavior in the
m-ADC taskwith unequal sensitivities. Themodel relates the conditional
probability of each type of response for each stimulus event to the per-
ceptual sensitivity (d) and choice criterion (c) at each location.
We define a multivariate decision variable,, whose ith component
i represents the sensory evidence at location i (i {1…m}).Weposit, as
in conventional SDT, that at baseline (no change event), each decision
variable componenti has a zeromean and unit variance Gaussian (unit
normal) distribution, also called the “noise” distribution. The assump-
tion of zero mean for the noise distribution simplifies model develop-
ment. The model with a nonzero noise mean can be equivalently
developed by simply translating the coordinate axes (Sridharan et al.,
2014b) and does not alter the results presented here.
A change (target) at location i (Xi  1) increases the mean of the
decision variable distribution at that location by an amount di (i.e., di
E(i Xi 1) E(iXi 0).We term di, an indicator of signal strength,
the “perceptual sensitivity” for distinguishing a signal (target or change)
fromnoise (no target or change) at location i. In general, di is determined
by the physical strength of the stimulus event (e.g., contrast or orienta-
tion change magnitude) and can be modulated by attention.
In addition, we specify that the components i are independently
distributed, so that the covariance matrix of, which we denote as C, is
an identity (unit) matrix as follows:C I;Cii 1,Cij 0, i, j {1,…,m},
i j. This implies that across trials, the noisy fluctuations in the decision
variable’s value at a location are uncorrelated with the fluctuations in its
values at all other locations.
Sridharan et al. •Mechanistic Role of the Midbrain in Attention J. Neurosci., January 18, 2017 • 37(3):480–511 • 481
Thus, the decision variable is distributed as follows (Eq. 1):
(X)  Nm( d J X, C I) Ae

k1
m
1
2
	kdkXk
2
where Nm is the multidimensional Gaussian density function, d is a
vector whose ith component is di (perceptual sensitivity at loca-
tion i), J denotes the element-wise multiplication operation, and A is
a normalization constant in order forNm to be a probability density
(A  1/(2)m/2).
Because of the independence of the i, Equation 1 can be equiva-
lently written in terms of the marginals (DeCarlo, 2012), as follows
(Eq. 2):
Figure1. Multidimensional signal-detection (m-ADC)model todissociatebias fromsensitivity effects inmultialternative attention tasks.A, Schematic of a spatial two-alternative, cueddetection
task. The subject initiates a trial by fixating on a dot at the center of the screen. A cue (white line segment) indicates the likely location of subsequent target stimulus. A target (positive contrast dot)
is briefly presentedat oneof twopotential target locations. The subject is rewarded for indicating the locationof the targetwith a saccade (line) to the corresponding responsebox (squares). On catch
trials, no target is presented for a prolonged period following fixation. On these trials, the subject is rewarded for maintaining fixation on the zeroing dot even after the response boxes appear.
B, Distributions of the bivariate decision variable () in a two-dimensional decision space for no-stimulus (catch; n), stimulus at location 1 (s1), and stimulus at location 2 (s2). Dashed white lines
indicate orthogonal perceptual dimensions for locations 1 and 2, respectively. Units: SD of the decision variable distribution. Black curves, One-dimensional Gaussians,marginal distributions of each
decision variable component. The s1 and s2 distributions correspond to the n distribution translated along the respective perceptual dimension by an amount equal to the perceptual sensitivity for
detecting the stimulus at that location (d1 or d2, respectively). Perceptual sensitivity at location 1 is illustrated as greater than at location 2 (d1 d2), as could result from cueing location 1 for
attention. C, Log posterior odds ratio () and the family of optimal decision surfaces (hyperplanes) of constant (dashed lines) for distinguishing a stimulus at location 1 versus noise (s1 vs n), a
stimulus at location 2 versus noise (s2 vs n); and a stimulus at location 1 versus at location 2 (s1 vs s2). D, Decision variable () distributions (circles) and putative optimal decision surfaces (thick
black lines) for the2-ADCmodelwithunequal perceptual sensitivities (d1d2) and choice criteria (c1 c2) at the two locations. Solid circle, Contourof thenoisedistribution; dot-dashedanddashed
circles, contours of the signal distribution for a stimulus at location 1 and 2, respectively. The decision boundaries partition the decision space into nonoverlapping domains for each potential
response: NoGo (unshaded region), Go response to location 1 (light shading), or Go response to location 2 (dark shading). One-dimensional Gaussians along each axis:marginal distributions of each
decision variable component. Dasheddiagonal linewith X symbol: line of equal sensory evidence (12). E, A cued two-alternative orientation-change detection paradigm. Following fixation,
the subject is presented with two oriented gratings that flashed on and off for variable durations. At a random time, the orientation of one of the gratings changes, and the subject is rewarded for
making a saccadic eye movement to the location of change (change trials) or for maintaining fixation on trials when no change occurred (catch trials). Attention is cued to a location across a block
of trials by increasing the probability of change occurrence at that location (dashed white circle). The task is conceptually similar to one in which an explicit cue is presented on each trial (A). F,
Simulated percentage correct as a function of sensitivity (d) for detecting orientation changes at cued (closed circles) and uncued (open circles) locations. G, Simulated psychometric functions,
percentage correct as a function of stimulus physical strength (e.g., orientation change magnitude or contrast) at cued (closed circles) and uncued (open circles) locations.
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i  diXi  i ; i  N (0, 1)
where i represents the noise distribution (unit normal) at location i and
N the one-dimensional Gaussian density function.
In our model, the components of d are not necessarily equal
(di  dj,  i j) so that the sensitivities to detect a change can be dif-
ferent across locations. Figure 1B,D illustrates the decision variable 
distribution for a two-alternative detection (2-ADC) model.
Optimal decision surfaces
In any behavioral task, it is reasonable to suppose that the subject
seeks to optimize some quantity of interest. Here, we derive the family
of optimal decision surfaces for the m-ADC model that maximize
average utility or minimize average risk; utility (or risk) is defined as
the benefit (or cost) associated with choosing a particular response
when a particular stimulus occurs, and is assumed to be uniquely
specified for each stimulus–response contingency. Here, we seek to
identify the family of optimal decision surfaces for the general case of
unequal di.
In deriving these optimal decision surfaces, we assume that the cost
of making an error for each change event is the same regardless of the
response type. For example, when a change happens at some location
k, we specify that the cost of making a Go response to any location
other than location k or a NoGo response are all the same. This is a
reasonable assumption for common multialternative tasks in which
the typical penalty for an error is withheld reward (same cost) regard-
less of the specific error. Notice, though, that we allow for these costs
to be different across the different change contingencies. For example,
an erroneous response when a change occurred at one location can be
more or less costly (e.g., more or less severely penalized) than the
same erroneous response when a change occurred at another location,
or during catch trials.
We define the following relations (to be used in our derivations) as
follows (Eqs. 3, 4):
Li0()
Nm(Xi1)
Nm(Xk0 @k)
i0	

pi
p0
Li0
where Li0() is the likelihood ratio corresponding to a change at loca-
tion i relative to no change, andi0	) is the posterior odds ratio given
by scaling the likelihood ratio by the prior odds ratio of a change at
location i relative to no change: pi /p0 p(Xi 1)/p(Xk 0 @ k).
Optimal decision surfaces in them-ADCmodel are hyperplanes of the
constant log posterior odds ratio as follows (Eqs. 5 and 6):kl() 	kl
and k0()  	k0, where kl	)
k0()
l0()

pk
pl
Nm(Xk1)
Nm(Xl1) is the
posterior odds ratio of a change at location k relative to a change at
location l, given the sensory evidence () and 	kl  	Cl
l 
 Cl
k
/
	Ck
k 
 Ck
l
, where Cl
k represents the cost of responding to location
k when a change occurred at location l (k, l  {0, 1, 2, . . . m}), Ck
0
represents the cost of giving aNoGo response, when a change occurred at
location k andC0
k represents the cost of responding to location k, whenno
change occurred (catch trial). This result has been demonstrated previ-
ously in Sridharan et al. (2014b) for the case of equal sensitivities, and
holds true here in the case of unequal sensitivities as well.
We next identify the exact form of these optimal decision surfaces for
the m-ADC model in which sensitivity values can be widely different at
the two locations (Fig. 1B,D).
In an m-ADC task, the decision must be made among m locations
of change, and one no-change (or noise) contingency. Because the
distributions of the decision variables are Gaussian, calculating the
logarithm of the posterior odds ratio provides simpler mathematical
expressions; because of the monotonicity of the log function, isosur-
faces of the posterior odds ratio are also isosurfaces of the log poste-
rior odds ratio.
We first calculate the log-likelihood ratio for a change at location j
versus no-change (noise). From Equations 3 and 1 this is given by the
following (Eqs. 7 and 8):
log Lj0 log
Ae

1
2
(jdj)2  
k1,kj
m
1
2
k2
Ae

k1,
m
1
2
k2
  jdj 
 dj
2/ 2
where dj represents the perceptual sensitivity for a change at location j.
The log posterior odds ratio is given as follows (from Eq. 4):
log j0  log
pj
p0
jdj 

dj
2
2
Optimal decision surfaces for distinguishing a change at location j from
no change (isosurfaces of logj0) are of the following form (Eqs. 10 and
11; from Eq. 6):
log
pj
p0
jdj 

dj
2
2
 log 	j0
 j 
1
dj
 log 	 j0 
 log pjp0  dj
2
2 
 j  f		 j0, pj/p0, dj

Thus, these optimal surfaces are functions of the priors, costs (or pay-
offs), and sensitivity. For a given set of these parameters, we term the
value of this function as the choice criterion, cj, so that optimal decision
surfaces are hyperplanes of the formj cj. The subject decides between
no-change and a change at location j based on whether the decision
variable falls above or below the cutoff value specified by the choice
criterion at location j (j  cj).
Next, we calculate the log-likelihood ratio for a change at location i
versus a change at location j. This is given by the following (Eq. 12):
log Lij log
(XXi1)
(XXj1)
 log
Ae
1
2
	idi
2
k1,ki
m
1
2
k2
Ae
1
2
	jdj
2
k1,kj
m
1
2
k2

1
2
	2idi 
 di
2 
 2 jdj  dj
2

where di and dj represent sensitivities to changes at locations i and j,
respectively.
The log posterior odds ratio is given by the following (Eq.13):
log ij idi 

di
2
2

jdj 
dj
2
2
 log
pi
pj
Optimal decision surfaces for distinguishing a change at location i from a
change at location j (isosurfaces of logij) are of the following form (Eqs.
14–16):
idi 

di
2
2

  jdj 
dj
2
2
 log
pi
pj
 log 	ij
idi 
  jdj  log 	ij 
 log
pi
pj

di
2 
 dj
2
2
idi 
  jdj  f		ij, pi/pj, di, dj

Thus, as before, the optimal decision surfaces are a function of the priors,
costs (or payoffs), and sensitivities. We notate the value of right-hand
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side as Bij so that the optimal decision surfaces are hyperplanes of the
formidijdj Bij.
Figure 1C illustrates this family of optimal decision surfaces for the
2-ADC case.
To determine the value of the constant Bij, we employ the following
result: optimal decision surfaces defined by Equations 11 and 16 intersect
at a point (proved formally in Sridharan et al., 2014b). It is apparent that
if the decision surfaces do not intersect at a point (Fig. 1D, thick black
lines), then the decision space could contain domains where the optimal
decision is not uniquely specified.
Given this, each of the decision surfaces defined by Equation 16
must pass through the point of intersection of the optimal decision
surfaces defined in Equation 11, given by (i,j) (ci,cj). Hence, the
constant Bij  cidi  cjdj and the optimal decision hyperplane are
given by idi  jdj  cidi  cjdj or di(i  ci)  dj(j  cj).
Thus, optimal decision surfaces for the m-ADC model are given by
the following pair of equations (Eqs. 17 and 18): k  ck @ k and
di(i  ci)  dj(j  cj) @ i, j i  j.
Them-ADC decision rule
Based on the optimal decision surfaces derived above, the decision rule
for the m-ADC model may be defined as follows: the subject decides
between a change at location i versus no change based on whether the
component of the decision variable corresponding to that locationi fell
above or below the choice criterion ci. In addition, the subject decides
between a change at location i and a change at location j based on the
relative magnitudes of di	i 
 ci
  dj	j 
 cj
.
We formulate this decision rule analytically as follows (Eq. 19):
Y i if i  ci  k1,ki
m di	i 
 ci
 dk	k 
 ck

Y 0 if k1
m k  ck
where represents the intersection of the various constraints. According to
this rule, the subject’s ultimate choice of response location (say, r) is the one
atwhich thedecisionvariable componentexceeds thecriterion(r cr) and
the one at which the magnitude of dr(r  cr) is largest (among all loca-
tions). If no decision variable component exceeds criterion at any location
(k ck,@k), then the subject gives a NoGo response (Y 0).
Figure 1D illustrates this decision rule for the 2-ADC case.
Note thatwhen di dj, this decision rule reduces to that for anm-ADC
model with equal sensitivities (Sridharan et al., 2014b), in which the
decision rule is independent of the sensitivity at each location. Thus, the
key difference in this case of unequal sensitivities is that the decision rule
also incorporates the relative values of sensitivity at each pair of locations.
Using a 2-ADCmodel, the differencemay be characterized geometrically
as follows: for the 2-ADC case with equal sensitivities, the oblique deci-
sion boundary in Figure 1D is a line tilted at 45° relative to each decision
axis, whereas for the 2-ADC case with unequal sensitivities, the oblique
decision boundary is a linewhose tilt depends on the relative values of the
sensitivities at each location.
Relating response probabilities to sensitivities and criteria
The probability of a particular response for a stimulus event can be
expressed as the product of the prior probability of a stimulus event with
the conditional probability of that response for that stimulus event. The
prior probability of each stimulus event is governed by the task specifi-
cation. Here, we derive the conditional probability of a response to loca-
tion i for each stimulus event X, based on the decision rule as follows
(Eq. 20):
p	Y  iX
 p	i  ci  k,kidi	i 
 ci
 dk	k 
 ck


Substituting for i, k based on the latent variable model from (Eq. 2)
yields (Eq. 21):
p	Y  iX
 p	i  ci 
 diXi  k,kidi	i  diXi 
 ci
 dk	k
 dkXk 
 ck

.
Conditioning the above probability on a given value of i ei yields the
following (Eq. 22) :
p	Y  iX, e
 p	ei  ci 
 diXi  k,kidi	ei  diXi 
 ci

 dk	k  dkXk 
 ck


H(ei 
 ci  diXi)  k,ki p(k 
di
dk
(ei  diXi 
 ci)
 dkXk  ck)
H(ei 
 ci  diXi) 
k,ki
F didk(ei  diXi 
 ci)
 dkXk  ck
where H is the Heaviside function, F is the cumulative distribution
function of the unit normal distribution N, and we have factored the
joint probability into the product of themarginal probabilities, as the i’s
are independently distributed.
The conditional probability of a response at location i is then expressed
as follows (Eq. 23):
p	Y  iX
	
cidiXi
 
k,ki
F didk (ei diXi
 ci)
 dkXk ckN(ei)dei
This conditional probability represents an integration over the noise
distribution (ei).
The probability of a NoGo response, p(Y  0X ), for each stimulus
event, X, can be obtained from the probabilities of the other responses as
follows: p	Y  0X
  1 
 
i1
m p	Y  iX). Formally, this can be
shown to be equal to the following (Eq. 24):
p	Y  0X
 p	 k k  ck 
 dkXk


k
p	k  ck 
 dkXk


k
F(ck 
 dkXk)
where, as before, we have factored the joint probability of the indepen-
dent k’s into the product of the marginal probabilities.
For the 2-ADC case, the NoGo response rate during catch trials (i.e., the
correct rejection rate) is given by p	Y  0X1  0,X2  0
  F(c1)F(c2).
The false-alarmrateduring catch trials is, hence,pfa  1 
 F(c1)F(c2).Thus,
given the false-alarm rate during catch trials, and one of the criteria (say c1), the
other criterion (c2) is determinedby the following relation (Eq. 25):
c2  F11
 pfaF(c1) 
Relationship between choice criterion, choice bias, priors,
and payoffs
Based on the results derived above,we formalize the relationship between
the choice criterion, choice bias, priors, and payoffs in the m-ADC
model.
We reproduce Equation 11 here as follows (Eq. 26):
cj 
1
dj
 log 	j0 
 log pjp0  dj
2
2 
cj 
1
dj
log  	j0pj/p0 dj2
Let us examine each term in turn.
First, the optimal choice criterion at each location j, cj, depends on the
logarithmof the relative cost or benefit of choosing each alternative (	j0):
the greater the benefit (or the smaller the cost) of a correct Go response to
location j (“hit”), relative to a NoGo response (“miss”; Cj
j 
 Cj
0), the
lower the value of 	j0, and the lower the optimal cj. This defines the
analytical relationship between the “payoff” at location j and the optimal
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choice criterion to report changes at that location: the greater the payoff,
the lower the optimal choice criterion value.
Second, the optimal choice criterion cj depends on the logarithmof the
prior odds ratio (pj/p0): the greater the value of the prior probability for
a change event at location j (the “prior”), the larger the prior odds ratio,
and the smaller the value of the optimal cj. This defines the analytical
relationship between the “prior” at location j and the optimal choice
criterion to report changes at that location: the greater the prior, the
lower the optimal choice criterion value.
Finally, the optimal choice criterion is also a (nonlinear) function of
the perceptual sensitivity to the change event at location j, dj.
When sensitivities to events at different locations are equal, the relative
values of the choice criteria suffice to quantify choice bias. A lower value
of criterion at a location (relative to another location) represents a ten-
dency to afford greaterweight to the sensory evidence at that location and
a greater choice bias toward that location (Sridharan et al., 2014b). On
the other hand,when sensitivities to different locations are different, as in
attention tasks, this definition of bias no longer suffices, because this
definition of choice bias is a function of sensitivity.
Wedefine choice bias for thismore general scenario. First, we note that
in the absence of differences in prior probabilities (pj p0) and relative
costs (	j0  1), the optimal criterion is given by cj  dj/2 (from Eq. 26;
i.e., the optimal criterion is located at themidpoint of the signal andnoise
distributions). We refer to this criterion as cj
. The difference cj 
 cj

represents the “constant criterion” measure of bias, analogous to the
measure defined in Macmillan and Creelman (2005) for the 2-AFC task.
Here, we define choice bias, based on the likelihood ratio measure, as
follows (Eq. 27):
log bj  
log Lj0(j  cj)
 
 dj	cj 
 cj


 log pj/p0	j0 
The last relationship is obtained by rearranging Equation 26. Thus, for
optimal decisions, choice bias to give a Go response to location j (vs a
NoGo response) in the m-ADCmodel is given by the following (Eq. 28):
bj  e
dj	cjcj



pj/p0
	 j0
bj is analytically related to the prior odds ratio and to the relative payoffs
(for the 2-AFC model, compare with Macmillan and Creelman, 2005,
their Eq. 2.11). Even when targets of different strengths are sampled at a
location (e.g., as when measuring the psychometric function), as long as
the priors and payoffs do not change with target strength, the optimal
biasmeasure remains invariant to sensitivity values. The relative values of
b represent the relative biases to give a Go response to different locations.
For suboptimal decisions, other sources of bias can be captured within
this framework, with a multiplicative term, as follows (Eq. 29):
bj  pj/p0	 j0 bjs
where bj
s represents a component of bias that leads to suboptimal deci-
sions. This could include contributions from motoric response biases,
irrational biases, or biases that originate from sources other than priors
and payoffs. Because the model estimates dj and cj, choice bias bj can be
quantifiedwith Equation 28. If the values of the priors (pj/p0) and payoffs
(	j0) are precisely known, the value of the suboptimal bias, bj
s, can be
quantified.
Optimal two-alternative detection model for 100% valid cues is a two-
alternative forced-choice (Yes-No) model. We first consider the two-
alternative detection (2-ADC) model where the change can happen at
one of two locations, or not at all. For this model, response probabilities
are related to the sensitivities and criteria by the following set of equa-
tions (Eqs. 30 and 31):
p	Y 1X
	
c1d1X1

F d1d2 (e1  d1X1 
 c1)
 d2X2  c2N (e1)de1
p	Y 2X
	
c2d2X2

F d2d1 	e2  d2X2 
 c2

 d1X1  c1N (e2)de2
These are the same as Equation 23 but adapted for the two-alternative
case.
The optimal choice criterion for distinguishing a change at location 2
from no change (Eq. 11) is as follows (Eq. 32):
2
  c2 
1
d2
 log 	20 
 log p2p0  d2
2
2 
Now, let one of the two locations, say 1, be cued with a 100% valid cue so
that changes can happen at this location or not at all; these two events are
mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Thus, the prior probability of a
change at location 2, p2 0.
In this case, from Equation 32 the optimal criterion at location 2 tends
to infinity (i.e., lim
p2¡0
c2¡  ). Substituting this limit into Equations
30 and 31 results in the following (Eqs. 33 and 34):
p	Y  1X
	
c1d1X1

lim
s¡
F(s)N (e1) de1 F (d1X1
 c1)
p	Y  2X
	


lim
s¡
F(s)N (e2) de2  0
where we have assumed that the other three parameters, d1, d2 and c1, are
finite, and have employed the following identities: lim
s¡
F (s)  1;
lim
s¡
F (s)  0 and 
q N (e)de  F (
 q).
These equations highlight three key results for the optimal 2-ADC
model with a 100% valid cue: (1) the probability of a response to location
2 is vanishingly small (rarely or never occurs), (2) the hit rate at location
1, h1, corresponding to the probability of a response to location 1 when a
change occurred at location 1, p(Y  1X1  1, X2  0) is given by
F(d1 
 c1), and (3) the false-alarm rate at location 1, f1, corresponding
to the probability of a response to location 1 when no change occurred,
p	Y  1X1  0,X2  0
 is given byF(
 c1) .
Rearranging 2 and 3, we get the following (Eq. 35):
d1  F1(h1)
F1(f1) c1 F1(f1)
These equations are identical to the two-alternative forced-choice (2-
AFC) Yes/Nomodel (Macmillan and Creelman, 2005) in which a change
can occur at location 1 or not at all. Thus, the optimal two-alternative
detectionmodel reduces to a 2-AFC (Yes/No)modelwhen cues are 100%
valid.
Extension of the model to perceptual discrimination tasks
The m-ADC model described above was formulated for detection and
change-detection tasks. Themodel can be readily extended to perceptual
discrimination tasks that, optionally, incorporate a NoGo response (see
Fig. 7A). In this task the subjectmust discriminate between one of several
features (e.g., direction of dot motion) of the target stimulus. We de-
scribe themodel for this two-alternative discrimination task (see Fig. 7A,
distinguishing between leftward vs rightwardmotion) inwhich the target
can occur at one of two locations.
For thismodel, the decision variable distribution is specified as follows
(Eq. 36):
i  diXisi  i; i  N (0, 1) i  {1, 2}
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Note that this is the same as the decision variable distribution for the
m-ADC model from Equation 2 with the exception of the multiplica-
tive term si. We specify that si takes the value 1 when the stimulus is
moving in a rightward direction at location i and takes a value 1
when the stimulus is moving leftward at location i. In general, the
convention for the sign of si at each location i can be arbitrary, as long
as signal strength in one direction is represented along the positive
axis and in the other direction is represented along the negative axis of
the decision variable for that location (i). With this specification,
the sensitivity to discriminate between leftward and rightward mo-
tion at location i is given by 2 di.
We hypothesize the subject employs choice criteria c1 andc1 at loca-
tion 1, and c2 and c2 at location 2 when making a decision about the
perceived direction of motion, as shown in Figure 7B,C. The decision
rule is formulated as follows (Eq. 37):
Y  R if 	1  c1  d1	1 
 c1
 d2	2 
 c2

 
	1  c1 2  
c2  d1	1  c1
 d2	2  c2


Y  L if 	2  c2  d1	1 
 c1
 d2	2 
 c2

 
	1  
c1 2  c2  d1	1  c1
 d2	2  c2

)
Y  N if 
 c1 1  c1  
c2 2  c2
where Y  R, Y  L, and Y  N indicate rightward motion, leftward
motion, and NoGo responses, respectively. The decision is based on a
family of six decision boundaries. Four of these boundaries represent
lines parallel to the decision axes corresponding to 1  c1, 1 
c1, 2  c2, and 2  c2. The angle of the oblique decision
boundaries are determined by the relative values of d1 and d2 as with
the m-ADC model decision rule (Eq. 19), and their equations are
given by d1(1 c1)  d2(2 c2) and d1(1 c1)  d2(2 c2).
This decision rule partitions the decision space into three domains: the
first corresponding to a Go response indicating rightward motion (see
Fig. 7B,C, lower right), the second corresponding to a Go response in-
dicating leftward motion (see Fig. 7B,C, upper left), and the third corre-
sponding to a NoGo response (see Fig. 7B,C, gray-shaded region). On
each trial, the subject indicates rightward or leftward motion or gives a
NoGo response, depending on the region of the decision space into
which the decision variable falls on that trial. Thus, the probability of
each type of response is given by the following (Eq. 38):
p	Y  LX
	

c1 	

d1
d2
	1c1
c2
	X; d1, d2
 d2 d1
 	
c1
c1 	

c2
(X; d1, d2 d2 d1
 	
c1
 	
c2
d1
d2
	1c1
c2
(X; d1, d2 d2 d1
p	Y  RX
	

c1 	d1
d2
	1c1
c2

(X; d1, d2 d2 d1
 	
c1
c1 	
c2

(X; d1, d2 d2 d1
 	
c1
 	d1
d2
	1c1
c2

(X; d1, d2 d2 d1
p	Y  NX
	
c1
c1 	
c2
c2
	X; d1, d2
 d2 d1
where p(Y  LX ) represents the conditional probability of indicating
leftward motion (Go, L), p(Y  RX ) represents the conditional proba-
bility of indicating rightwardmotion (Go, R), p(YNX ) represents the
conditional probability of a NoGo response and, as before, X is a multi-
variate random variable whose ith component,Xi, denotes the location of
the stimulus on each trial: Xi  1 indicates a stimulus at location i, and
Xi 0, otherwise.
In tasks in which the subject is not permitted to make a NoGo re-
sponse, and if the decision variable falls within theNoGo response region
on a given trial, we specify that the subject indicates either direction of
motion with equal (50%) probability, with no response bias toward ei-
ther direction. In this case, the probability of leftward and rightward Go
responses is given by the following (Eq. 39):
p	Go, LX
 p	Y LX

1
2
p	Y NX

p	Go, RX
 p	Y RX

1
2
p	Y NX

These equations are the basis for the simulations shown in Figure 7 (see
Materials and Methods, Motion direction discrimination task with SC
microstimulation).
Extension of the model to “filtering” tasks involving
perceptual discrimination
In the previous section, we extended the m-ADC model to discrimination
tasks inwhich the target stimulus occurs alone.Here, we demonstrate how a
similar formulation can be applied to tasks in which the target occurs con-
currentlywithoneormore foil (distracter) stimuli (seeFig. 8). Such tasks are
termed “filtering” tasks in literature (Lovejoy andKrauzlis, 2010; Ze´non and
Krauzlis, 2010).We take the specific case of the filtering discrimination task
employed inLovejoy andKrauzlis (2010). The task is described inFigure 8A,
and involves reporting the direction of motion in the target patch while
ignoringmotion in the foil patch(es).
In thismodel, we specify that the sensory evidence at the target and foil
locations are represented along mutually orthogonal directions (along
the x-axis and y-axis, respectively; see Fig. 8B). In the Lovejoy andKrauz-
lis (2010) task, the target-patch motion could occur in one of four diag-
onal directions: (45°,45°,135°,135°). The foil motion occurred
in one of the remaining three directions. Here, for simplicity of illustrat-
ing the model, we posit that modeling any one pair of target and foil
motion directions should give results not different from modeling any
other pair of directions.We chose the direction of target motion to be up
and to the right (45°) and the direction of foil motion to be down and
to the left (135°). This simplification nevertheless captures the essential
results of Lovejoy and Krauzlis (2010; see Fig. 8D,E). The task employed
in the Lovejoy and Krauzlis study (2010), including the two other poten-
tial directions ofmotion (45°,135°), can bemodeled in its entirety by
adding two more dimensions orthogonal to the target and foil dimen-
sions shown in Figure 8B.
For our model, the decision variable distribution is defined as follows
(Eq. 40):
d;  N 2(0, 1)
[t f]
T; ddt df
T
wheret andf are the marginal distributions of the decision variables
for the target and foil locations, respectively, and the target and foil
motion strengths are denoted dt and df, respectively. The key difference
with the previous latent variable formulation is that, in this case, because
multiple stimuli (target, foil) are concurrently presented on each trial, the
mean of the decision variable distribution (dt, df) does not lie along either
coordinate axis but rather within one of the four quadrants (see Fig. 8B,
dashed gray circle).
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On the other hand, the decision rule is identical with the previous
model, except that we posit that the subject employs choice criteria ct and
ct at the target’s location, and cf and cf at the foil’s location when
making a decision, as shown in Figure 8B. The decision rule, for this
example, is as follows (Eq. 41):
Y   45 if 	t  ct  dt	t 
 ct
 df	f 
 cf

 
	t  ct f  
cf  dt	t  ct
 df	f  cf


Y  
135 if 	f  cf  dt	t 
 ct
 df	f 
 cf

 
	t  
ct f  cf  dt	t  ct
 df	f  cf

)
Y  N if 
 ct t  c1  
cf f  cf
In this case, Y  45° represents a correct answer indicating the target
direction, Y  135° represents an incorrect answer indicating the foil
direction, and YN represents an incorrect answer indicating “neither”
target nor foil direction (one of the other directions: 45° or 135°).
Alternative decision rules are also possible for this task, such as one in
which the decision boundary is a line passing through the origin whose
tilt indicates the bias for target versus foil, or one inwhich the boundaries
of the “neither” response are oriented diagonally (rather than parallel to
the axes). We employed the decision rule in Equation 41 here, as it was
essentially identical with that of the previous model (Eq. 37) and cap-
tured key aspects of the Lovejoy and Krauzlis (2010) results. Formal
model comparisons are necessary to select the best among these different
decision rules.
We posit that the probability of a correct (target-based) or incorrect
(foil-based or neither) response will remain the same regardless of the
specific choice of target or foil motion. Hence, we define the probability
of a response based on target motion, p(Y 45°X ), as the probability of
a correct response, p(Y CX ), and the probability of a response based
on foil motion, p(Y135°X ), as the probability of an incorrect (foil-
based) response, p(Y  FX ). Thus, the probability of each type of re-
sponse is given by the following (Eq. 42):
p	Y  CX
	

ct 	

dt
df
	tct
cf
	X; dt, df df dt
 	
ct
ct 	

cf
(X; dt, df d f dt
 	
ct
 	

dt
df
	tct
cf
(X; dt, df d f dt
p	Y  FX
	

ct 	dt
df
	tct
cf

(X; dt, df d f dt
 	
ct
ct 	
cf

(X; dt, df d f dt
 	
ct
 	dt
df
	tct
cf

(X; dt, df d f dt
p	Y  NX
	
ct
ct 	
cf
cf
	X; dt, df
 d f dt
These equations are the basis for the simulations shown in Figure 8 (see
Materials andMethods, Motion direction discrimination (filtering) task
with SC inactivation).
Behavioral tasks
Four-alternative spatial target detection task
Chickens (n 3) were trained on a four-alternative target detection task
based on luminance (Fig. 2A), reported previously (Sridharan et al.,
2013). A subset of the data from the previous study was reanalyzed here
within the framework of the m-ADC model to distinguish bias from
sensitivity effects. The behavioral paradigm is summarized below. For
details regarding the behavioral apparatus and training protocol, refer to
Sridharan et al. (2013).
A brief (50 ms) dot stimulus, 3° in diameter (target), was presented at
one of four potential locations in the bird’s visual field. Target locations
and dimensions were defined relative to the midsagittal plane and the
horizontal plane that contains the optical axes of the eyes and the tip of
the beak. To begin a trial, a small (5 mm) cross appeared at the center
of the computer screen (Fig. 2A). To peck on the cross, the chicken had to
position its body between two vertical posts, forcing the body into a
standard position relative to the screen. The chicken had to peck accu-
rately on the cross (within 10mm) to initiate a trial. Immediately after the
peck on the cross, the target appeared on the screen for 50 ms. The bird
was rewarded (brief access to food) for pecking at the location of the
target on stimulus trials, and for pecking twice on the cross (NoGo) on
catch trials. During training, NoGo responses to Go trials (misses) were
not rewarded. However, Go responses to NoGo trials (false alarms) were
penalized to minimize the rate of false alarms.
The target appeared at one of four possible locations: 60° in azimuth
and 60° in elevation from the zeroing cross in each of the four visual field
quadrants. Targets appeared with equal probability at any of the four
locations, and the sequence of target locations was pseudorandomized.
Luminance threshold for each target location was measured by stair-
casing target contrast (Sridharan et al., 2013). The analyses reported here
were performed after excluding the first several stimulus trials following
session initiation (10% contrast targets) to allow the animal’s behavior
to stabilize, although the results were similar with these data included.
Four-alternative orientation-change detection task
A monkey was trained on an orientation-change detection task with an
antisaccade component. The task sequence was as follows (Fig. 3A). A
small white dot appeared on the screen, and the monkey initiated a trial
by fixating it.Within 100ms, four peripheral stimuli appeared (described
below). After a period of 800–2700 ms, the four stimuli disappeared for
a brief interval (270 ms; blank period), and then reappeared. Upon
reappearance, one of the four stimuli had changed its orientation (i.e.,
had been rotated in place) on 50%of trials. On these trials (change trials),
the monkey could earn a reward by executing a saccadic eye movement
within 800ms to the stimulus located diagonally opposite to the changed
stimulus (antisaccade). On the other 50% of trials (catch trials), all four
stimuli reappeared with orientations identical to the initial orientations.
In this case, the monkey was rewarded for maintaining fixation on the
central dot for 800 ms (NoGo response).
The target stimuli were static, black and white square-wave gratings in
a circular Gaussian aperture. The gratings were 4° in diameter, 1 cycle/°,
at full contrast for themonitor. The four gratings were presented at equal
eccentricities (between 5 and 8° across sessions) and were spaced evenly
around a circle. The screen background was dark gray. The orientations
of the initial gratings took one of seven possible values, evenly spaced
from 0 to 157.5° in 22.5° intervals. The initial grating orientations were
chosen independently for each of the four stimuli and for each trial.
Rotationmagnitude ranged from 10 to 90° in 5° intervals. Rotationmag-
nitude and direction were independently chosen for each trial.
Four-alternative, cued orientation-change detection task
The cued orientation-change detection task was identical to the previous
task, except that change detection wasmade easier for themonkey by the
presentation of a quasisymbolic cue indicating which location would
contain the change. The cue consisted of a white line segment, less than
half a degree in length and one pixel in width, originating at the fixation
dot and extending in the direction of one of the four potential target
locations. The cue appeared after a brief delay (300–500 ms) following
presentation of the initial stimulus array, and indicatedwith 93%validity
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Figure 2. Analysis of a four-alternative target detection task with the m-ADC model. A, Spatial, four-alternative target detection task based on target luminance. The bird (chicken)
initiated a trial by pecking on the zeroing cross in the center of a touch-sensitive screen. Following trial initiation, a target (positive contrast, 3° dot) was presented briefly (50 ms) at one
of four potential locations, one in each visual quadrant (stimulus trials). On interleaved trials, no target was presented (catch trials). Birds were rewarded for pecking accurately at the
target’s location when it occurred and for pecking at the zeroing cross (NoGo) on trials when no stimulus was presented. Stimulus and catch trials were equally probable (50%). Targets
appeared with equal probability (25%) at any one of the four locations, pseudorandomly interleaved. Top left graphic, Numerical convention for identifying the target’s quadrant (1– 4)
on the screen. B, Observed response counts (numbers within cells) and conditional response probabilities (shading of cells). Data pooled across 108 experiments in three birds. Rows,
Target locations (as defined in A); last row (), no-stimulus (catch). Columns, Response locations (as defined in A); last column (), NoGo responses. Cells within white square, Hits
(diagonal cells) and misidentifications (off-diagonal cells) used for model predictions (E). C, Bayesian parameter estimation of the sensitivity (x-axis) and criterion ( y-axis) at each target
location (as defined in A) with the MCMC (Metropolis sampling) algorithm. Diamonds, Initial guess for each sensitivity and criterion; circles, final value for each sensitivity and criterion
after convergence (medians of the posterior distributions); trajectories, Markov chains for convergence from the initial guesses to the final values. Curves along axes, Gaussian fits to the
posterior distributions of the sensitivity and criterion values at each location. D, ML estimates of criteria (above) and sensitivities (below) for each location obtained by fitting the m-ADC
to the behavioral data from B. Bar shading, Numerical convention for identifying the target’s quadrant, as defined in A. Error bars, ML standard error. E, Model predictions of response
counts (numbers within cells) and probabilities (shading of cells) for the highlighted 4 4 cells of the contingency table, based on model parameters estimated from only the last row
and the last column of the contingency table (misses and false alarms); conventions as in B. F–G, Analyses for individual birds. F, ML estimates of sensitivities (left) and criteria (right)
for data analyzed from each bird individually with a 4-ADC model. Bar shading, Numerical convention for identifying the target’s quadrant, as defined in A. Error bars, ML standard error.
G, Response probabilities predicted from the model plotted against experimentally observed response probabilities. Open symbols, Probabilities not used for fitting the model
(predictions). Shaded dots, Probabilities used to fit the model. Symbol type, Individual birds. Inset, Smaller response probabilities in the contingency table plotted on a logarithmic scale.
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Figure 3. Analysis of a four-alternative orientation-change detection task with them-ADCmodel. A, Spatial four-alternative, orientation-change detection task. Themonkey initiated a trial by
fixating on a zeroing dot in the center of the screen. Following trial initiation, four stimuli (oriented gratings)were presented, one in each visual quadrant. After an unpredictable interval (800–2700
ms), the screenwent blank (150–300ms). Then, the four stimuli reappeared. On 50%of trials, one of the four gratings had changed in orientation by 10–90° (change trials), and on the remaining
trials none of the stimuli had changed (catch trials). The animal was rewarded for making an eye saccade diagonally opposite to the location of the changed stimulus (antisaccade) when a change
had occurred, andwas rewarded formaintaining fixation on the zeroing dot (NoGo) when no change had occurred (seeMaterials andMethods). Catch trials constituted 50% of all trials, and during
change trials, the orientation change could happen with equal probability (25%) at any one of the four locations. B, Observed response counts (numbers within cells) and conditional response
probabilities (shading of cells). Data pooled across orientation change values in n 22 experiments. Rows, Change locations (as defined inA); last row (), no-stimulus (catch). Columns, Response
locations (as defined in A); last column (), NoGo responses. Cells outside of white square, Cells representingmisses and false-alarm rates used to derive model parameters. Other conventions are
the same as in Figure 2B. C, ML estimates of sensitivities and criteria for each location estimated fromdata inB. Bar shading, Numerical convention for identifying the target’s quadrant, as inA. Error
bars, ML standard error. D, Response probabilities predicted from the model plotted against experimentally observed response probabilities. Triangles, Probabilities not used for fitting the model
(predictions). Shaded dots, Probabilities used to fit themodel. E, Model predictions for the central 4 4 cells of the contingency table based onmodel parameters estimated from only the last row
and the last column of the contingency table (misses and false alarms); conventions as inB. F, Criteria (c, open triangles) and psychophysical functions of sensitivity (d, circles) for various orientation
change values estimated for each quadrant (defined in A) from only 8 of 25 contingencies (B, cells outside the highlighted box). Values of d and cwere estimated by binning the orientation change
values into 16° bins. Black line, Naka–Rushton fit to the psychophysical function. Error bars, ML standard error.G, Psychometric functions of the proportion of observed responses (filled circles) and
model predictions (open triangles) based on the sensitivity and criteria estimates from F. The eight plots are arranged as four matched pairs (top and bottom). The top (Figure legend continues.)
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which of the four stimuli (if any)would change orientation. The stimulus
array disappeared after 600–2200 ms, while the cue remained on the
screen. Upon reappearance of the stimulus array, one of the four gratings
had changed its orientation on 50% of the trials, and the monkey was
rewarded for reporting the change location with an antisaccade to the
diagonally opposite target location, or for maintaining fixation on catch
trials. For this task, the amount of rotationwas one of three values: 45, 67,
or 90° (interleaved randomly). Performance during invalidly cued trials,
in which the change occurred at a location other than that indicated by
the cue, was measured only for the 45° change; these data were analyzed
for this task. Data from this task have been published previously (Stein-
metz and Moore, 2014). A subset of these data (first 12 recording ses-
sions) was reanalyzed herewithin the framework of them-ADCmodel to
quantify bias and sensitivity effects induced by cueing.
Model fitting
Model fitting was performed with unconstrained optimization tech-
niques:maximum likelihood estimation (MLE; line search) andBayesian
[Markov-chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)]. These techniques have been
described in detail in a previous study (Sridharan et al., 2014b). Both
estimation approaches produced virtually identical estimates for the pa-
rameter values and the associated SEs (Table 1).
Evaluating goodness of fit
We evaluated how well each model was able to account for the data with
a randomization test (based on the  2 statistic).We selected the random-
ization test over the more conservative, Pearson’s  2 goodness-of-fit test
because of low counts (5) for some stimulus–response contingencies.
However, in the model comparison section, we also report p values with
the Pearson’s  2 test (see Tables 9, 10). The randomization test was
conducted as follows: expected response probabilities were constructed
based on the best-fit m-ADC model parameters (MLE). We simulated
multinomial distributions of responses with random sampling from
these expected probabilities after matching the overall number of trials
for each stimulus event. This randomization procedure was repeated
100,000 times. The  2 statistic, based on observed and simulated re-
sponse counts, was computed for each of these replications to generate a
null distribution. Next, we computed the best-fit
2 based on the observed
responses and best-fit responses computed with the ML parameter esti-
mates. The pr values reported correspond to the proportion of values of
the null distribution that exceeded best-fit
2 . Model fits were deemed ac-
ceptable if prwas0.05 (typical pr values were in the range of 0.1–0.9; see
Tables 3, 8).
Evaluating predictive power
The predictive power of the model was measured as follows: consider a
multialternative detection task withm potential target stimulus locations
and catch trials (in total,m 1 stimulus events), and inwhich the subject
can give a Go response to one of the m locations (where the target was
detected) or can give a NoGo response (in total, m 1 response types).
Thus, this task has an (m 1) (m 1) stimulus–response contingency
table (Fig. 2B).
The m-ADC model fits the conditional probabilities of each response
type for each stimulus event (Materials and Methods, Eqs. 23 and 24).
Hence, of the (m  1)2 observations, m 2  m are independent (as
conditional probabilities for all response types for a given stimulus event
have to sum to 1). The m-ADCmodel is parametrized with only 2m free
parameters, the sensitivity (d) and the criterion (c) at each of the m
locations, far fewer than the number of independent observations (for
m 2). Therefore, we estimated model parameters based on a subset of
the experimentally measured stimulus–response contingencies, specifi-
cally the misses and false alarms (last row and column of each contin-
gency table; see below for why these contingencies were chosen). With
parameter values thus estimated, wemeasured the ability of themodel to
predict the animals’ responses to all of the remaining stimulus–response
contingencies in the table (Fig. 2E, highlighted square). The predicted
responses were then compared with the experimentally observed re-
sponses with goodness-of-fit tests, as described above.
For each four-alternative task (Figs. 2A, 3A, 4A), we estimated param-
eters (sensitivities, criteria) based on data from eight stimulus–response
contingencies, and tested the ability of themodel to predict responses for
the remaining 17 contingencies. At a minimum, eight independent ob-
servations were necessary to estimate the eight model parameters. For
these predictions, we chose the four false-alarm and four miss rates (last
row and column of the contingency table, respectively). The model re-
quired at least one independent observation from each row and column
of the table: a sufficiently large number of responses for the miss (row)
and false-alarm (column) contingencies ensured that parameter estima-
tion was not sensitive to small variations in these response counts. We
performed MLE with the false alarms and misses by using the exact
response counts for these contingencies, and pooling across the response
counts (and probabilities) for other contingencies (hits and misidentifi-
cations), i.e., by pooling across each row of the highlighted 4 4 subset
of the contingency table (Figs. 2B, 3B, 4B). Thus, the model did not have
access to the distribution of responses in the 4  4 table, and had to
predict these based on the sensitivity and criterion estimated from only
the aforementioned eight data points. The 17th contingency, the correct-
rejection rate, was not used in parameter estimation, but was trivially
predicted as 1 fa, where fa is the overall false-alarm rate on catch trials
(sum of first four columns of the last row).
We tested for goodness of fit of the predicted to the observed
responses with a randomization test (described above).  2 values for
model fits were inflated when several cells in the contingency table
contained low (5) response counts, indicating apparently poor pre-
dictions (small p values; see Tables 3, 8, asterisks). For these cases,  2
statistics and p values were recomputed with counts aggregated across
the off-diagonal entries (incorrectly reported Go responses) for each
stimulus event. Acceptable fits with these aggregated counts (see Ta-
bles 3, 8, parenthetical values) indicated that the model successfully
predicted percentage correct performance and the overall percentage
of incorrect responses.
Analysis of the four-alternative orientation-change detection task
(monkey)
Two-stagemodel, incorporating lapse rates.Theattentionaldemands imposed
by the change-blindness paradigm and the complex rule of reporting a
change by making an antisaccade response resulted in less-than-perfect as-
ymptotic performance. Although the monkey rarely made saccades toward
the change location, saccades to locations adjoining the antisaccade response
location were occasionally made, even for the largest orientation changes
(70–90°) and shortest blank durations (150–200ms) tested.
Data from these trials, in which performance typically had asymptoted
(Fig. 3G), were used to construct an asymptotic-performance (AP) ma-
4
(Figure legendcontinued.) subplot of eachpair (black symbols) shows thepercentage correct
(hits) as a function of change magnitude (psychometric function of accuracy). The bottom
subplot of each pair (colored symbols) shows the percentage errors (incorrect/misidentifica-
tions) as a function of change magnitude. The four pairs are spatially aligned with the four
corresponding locations of change occurrence (A). In each plot, colors indicate the locations of
the responses relative to the location of change. Black, Response to the location of change; blue,
response to the diagonally opposite location; red, responses to the location in the same vertical
hemifield; green, responses to the location in the opposite hemifield.
Table 1. Model fits and parameters for 4-ADC target detection task: ML and
Bayesian estimates of sensitivities and criteria (pooled data)
Parameter MLE (mean SE) Bayesian (mean SE) 95% CI
Sensitivity d1 2.62 0.08 d1 2.66 0.06 d1: 2.50 2.77
d2 2.58 0.08 d2 2.57 0.09 d2: 2.44 2.70
d3 2.58 0.05 d3 2.59 0.06 d3: 2.52 2.67
d4 2.00 0.05 d4 2.00 0.05 d4: 1.94 2.07
Criterion c1 2.80 0.07 c1 2.83 0.08 c1: 2.70 2.93
c2 2.73 0.07 c2 2.73 0.08 c2: 2.63 2.84
c3 1.77 0.03 c3 1.77 0.04 c3: 1.72 1.83
c4 1.90 0.03 c4 1.90 0.04 c4: 1.85 1.95
Location 1, Upper right; location 2, upper left; location 3, lower left; location 4, lower right.
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trix (see Table 4; complement of a lapse-rate matrix). This matrix indi-
cated themonkey’s best performance in executing a correct (antisaccade)
response, following a detected change. Hence, for this task, we employed
the following two-stage model to predict the animal’s actual response
probabilities. Response probabilities were predicted with the m-ADC
model usingML parameter estimates based on onlymiss and false-alarm
rates (as described above). We then convolved these response probabil-
ities, which corresponded to the animal’s perception of the change, with
the APmatrix, which corresponded to the animal’s ability to execute the
appropriate response. The data used for the construction of the AP ma-
trix were excluded from further analysis. A single AP matrix was suffi-
cient to accurately predict responses across the range of rotation
magnitudes, and did not have to be tailored to fit responses for each
rotation value.
When the change was preceded by a 100% valid cue (data acquired in
trials interleaved with uncued trials), AP was near perfect (hit rates in the
APmatrixwere generally90%; see Table 5). The high validity of the cue
provided the animal with reliable information regarding the response
location before the upcoming change, resulting in the animal making far
fewer mistakes when executing the subsequent response. Thus, the AP
matrix was not necessary and did not significantly improve model fits in
the cued detection task (Fig. 4).
Estimation of psychometric functions. Psychometric functions of
change magnitude were constructed as follows: detection performance
across orientation changemagnitudes (10–90°) was binned in five evenly
spaced (16°) bins (clockwise and counterclockwise rotations pooled).
Miss rates for each bin of rotation magnitudes, and overall false-alarm
rates during catch trials (which, by definition, did not vary with rotation
magnitudes) were then entered into the MLE procedure to produce psy-
chophysical functions of sensitivity across rotation magnitudes (Fig. 3F,
filled circles) and corresponding criteria (Fig. 3F, triangle) for each
change location. Psychometric functions at each location were estimated
for each rotationmagnitude andwere convolvedwith the APmatrix. The
resulting predicted and observed psychometric functions are shown in
Figure 3G (inverted, open triangles).
Analysis of the cued orientation change detection task: pooling of
data across cue positions
The four potential cue locations (one in each quadrant) yielded four
5  5 stimulus–response contingency tables (one for each cue loca-
tion). Because invalid cues constituted only 7% of all trials, and
responses to these were distributed among 15 cells (3 cue-invalid
locations 5 potential responses to each), several stimulus–response
contingencies contained very low response counts. To fit the model
robustly, we combined response counts across cue locations by pool-
ing responses to locations relative to the cue location as either same-
as-cue (C), diagonally opposite (R), same hemifield (S), or mirror-
symmetric opposite hemifield (O; Fig. 4A, top). This pooling created
a single 5 5 contingency table (Fig. 4B) of the monkey’s responses to
validly cued (Fig. 4B, third row) and invalidly cued (Fig. 4B, first,
second, and fourth rows) locations. Responses for the change trials
(Fig. 4B, first four rows) were acquired at a single magnitude of target
orientation change: 45°.
Other analysis procedures were identical to those for the uncued ori-
entation change detection task, except, as described above, the APmatrix
(correction for lapse rates) was not used for this task, as it did not signif-
icantly improve fits.
Model comparison
We compared three candidate models against the 4-ADC model: (1)
4-ADC equal criteria (4-ADC eq crit), (2) 4-ADC equal sensitivity (4-
ADC eq sens), and (3) 5-AFC.
Figure 4. Analysis of a cued orientation-change detection task with the m-ADC model. A, Spatial four-alternative, cued orientation-change detection task. A monkey was trained on a
four-alternative, cuedorientation-changedetection task. The taskwas identical to the task shown in Figure 3A, except that on each trial a cue (directed line segment close to fixation spot), indicating
the location of the upcoming change with90% validity, appeared shortly after stimulus onset. B, Contingency table as in Figure 3B, except that reported responses correspond to a single
magnitude of orientation change: 45°. C, ML parameter estimates, as in Figure 3C. D, Model predictions, as in Figure 3E. E, Response probabilities predicted from the model plotted against
experimentally observed response probabilities for data analyzed individually for each cue location. Open symbols, Probabilities not used for fitting the model (predictions). Shaded dots,
Probabilities used to fit the model. Symbol type, Individual cued locations.
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The 4-ADC eq crit model. The 4-ADC eq crit model is a signal-
detection model that incorporates a symmetric decision rule with the
same criteria for all alternatives (Fig. 5C,D; Macmillan and Creelman,
2005). Themodel specified a single, uniform choice criterion to stimuli at
all locations, resulting in three fewer parameters (four sensitivity param-
eters and one criterion) compared with the 4-ADCmodel. This model is
a simplification of the 4-ADCmodel in that all aspectswere identical with
the 4-ADC model except that the choice criteria for all locations were
assumed to be equal.
The 4-ADC eq sens model. The 4-ADC eq sens model is a signal-
detection model that assumes equal sensitivities at all locations (Fig.
5E,F; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005). The model specified a single,
uniform d to stimuli at all locations, resulting in three fewer parameters
(four criterion parameters and one sensitivity) compared with the
4-ADCmodel. Thismodel is a simplification of the 4-ADCmodel in that
all aspects were identical with the 4-ADCmodel except that the sensitiv-
ities for all locations were assumed to be equal.
The 5-AFC model. The 5-AFC model is a signal-detection model that
treats NoGo responses as an extra alternative in a forced-choice design
(Fig. 5G,H ). The data were analyzed with a model with one additional
dimension, as if the task were a five-alternative forced-choice (5-AFC)
design, based on a recent multialternative forced-choice model (De-
Carlo, 2012). For fitting a 5  5 design, this model requires estimating
nine parameters (five sensitivity and four criterion parameters), one
more than the m-ADC model.
These candidate models and the number of free parameters for each
model are given in Tables 9 and 10. Parameters were estimated with the
MLE approach. For the 5-AFCmodel, all criteria were quantified relative
to the criterion for the NoGo response as reference. With the log-
likelihood function from these ML model fits, we computed the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC;
see Tables 9, 10; Burnham and Anderson, 2002).
Matlab code for fitting the m-ADC models (ML and MCMC) and
evaluating goodness of fit (randomization test) is available upon
request.
Model simulations and ideal observer analysis
The 2-ADC model was used to simulate data from attention tasks that
involve spatial cueing (Fig. 1E,F ) or microstimulation or inactivation of
the SC (see Figs. 7–9). Specific values for sensitivity and choice criterion
parameters were chosen based on ideal observer analysis (described be-
low) or with the aim of matching observed behavioral performance in
published studies (Cavanaugh and Wurtz, 2004; Mu¨ller et al., 2005;
Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010; Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012). In all of these
simulations, sensitivities are either assumed to be equal at all locations or
identical across conditions (e.g., control and inactivation). Hence, alter-
ing the criterion value differentially across locations simulates a change
of bias.
Simulation of the cued orientation-change detection task. For the simu-
lations shown in Figure 1E–G, d values across the two locations were
Figure 5. Comparison of m-ADC model with other candidate models. Leftmost column, Schematics of three models compared with the 4-ADC model (top). Compared with the 4-ADC model,
model 4-ADC eq crit and 4-ADC eq sens have three fewer parameters,whereasmodel 5-AFC has one additional parameter.A, C, E,G, ML estimates of criterion and sensitivity fromeachmodel for the
four-alternative target detection task (chickens). B, D, F,H, Correspondingmodel estimates for the four-alternative, cued orientation-change detection task (monkey). Other conventions are as in
Figure 2D. For details regarding models and model fitting, see Materials and Methods.
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assumed to be identical, and identically distributed (uniform distribu-
tion) across a range of 0 to 3.0 (measured in units of noise SD). We
performed ideal observer analysis by identifying the pair of criteria (one
at each location) that maximized the overall percentage correct for spec-
ified values or distributions of sensitivity (d), including performance on
all trial types (cued or uncued, change or catch; see below). These optimal
criteria were identified by an exhaustive search on a 400 400 grid over
a range of criteria spanning the interval [5.0, 5.0].
The percentage of correct and incorrect responses predicted by the
2-ADC model are a function of four parameters: the criterion and the
sensitivity at each of the two locations. We sought to reduce the number
of free parameters in the analysis. Training protocols formultialternative
detection tasks seek to reduce the tendency of the subject to guess when
no stimulus or change occurs (catch trials); this is achieved by rewarding
the subject for not guessing during catch trials (Cohen and Maunsell,
2009; Ze´non andKrauzlis, 2012; Steinmetz andMoore, 2014), increasing
the proportion of catch trials (Cavanaugh and Wurtz, 2004), and/or
penalizing (e.g., with time outs) Go responses during catch trials (false
alarms; Sridharan et al., 2013). As a result of this reinforcement strategy,
it is reasonable to infer that the subject would maintain a constant and
low proportion of false alarms (Go responses) during catch trials. The
implication of this assumption for 2-ADC simulations is that a decrease
in criterion at one location would be accompanied by an increase in
criterion at the other location, thereby quantitatively amplifying the be-
havioral effect in our simulations. With this assumption, the number of
free parameters in our analysis fell to just one criterion; the other was
automatically determined by the proportion of false alarms during catch
trials.
For this task, the percentage correct was computed as the percentage of
responses to the location of change in trials in which a change occurred at
any location. Psychophysical functions describing the variation of sensi-
tivity (d) with change magnitude (either orientation or motion direc-
tion) were modeled with a Naka–Rushton (hyperbolic ratio) function of
the following form: d  dmax (
n)/(n  50
n ), where  is the change
magnitude, dmax is the asymptotic sensitivity, n is the exponent (slope) of
the psychophysical function, and 50 is the orientation changemagnitude
at which the sensitivity reaches half of its asymptotic value. For these
simulations, we used the following values of these parameters: dmax 
4.0, n  1.0, 50  40° (for the orientation-change detection task), and
32° (for the motion-change detection task).
Simulation of the motion direction-change detection task with cueing
or SC microstimulation. For these simulations (Fig. 6), d values across
the two locations and parameters of the psychophysical function (Na-
ka–Rushton) were taken to be same as those for the previous simula-
tions. For the cued trials in this task, the optimal 2-ADC model
effectively reduces to a 2-AFC model. This can be understood intui-
Figure 6. Bias effects in a multialternative detection task with cueing or with microstimulation of the SC (Cavanaugh and Wurtz, 2004). A, A two-alternative motion direction-change
detection paradigm with interleaved cueing or microstimulation. Following fixation, two patches of random dot motion appeared. After a variable duration, the patches briefly
disappeared (150 ms) and reappeared. On some trials (change trials), the direction of motion had changed in one of the patches (target patch; dashed circle) upon reappearance; in
other trials (catch trials) no change in direction of motion occurred in any of the patches. The monkey was rewarded for making an eye saccade to the target patch on change trials and
for maintaining fixation (NoGo) on catch trials. In interleaved trials, a spatial cue indicated the location of the target patch (location of putative motion change) with 100% validity. In
other experiments, in place of spatial cues, focal electrical microstimulation was delivered to the spatial representation of the target patch in the SC. B, 2-ADC model for uncued trials (or
trials withoutmicrostimulation). Dashed gray circles, Distribution for changes at each location on uncued trials. Solid black circle, Distribution for no change trials. C, Model for cued
trials (or trials with microstimulation). Dashed black and gray circles, Distribution for changes at cued and uncued locations, respectively, on cued trials. Dashed thick gray line, The
criterion (decision boundary) at the uncued locationmoves to the edge of decision space (see text andMaterials andMethods). D, Simulated percentage correct as a function of sensitivity
for detecting motion changes (d) during cued/microstimulated (closed circles) and uncued (open circles) trials. E, Simulated psychometric function, percentage correct as a function of
motion direction change magnitude during cued/microstimulated and uncued trials. Other conventions are the same as in D. F, Simulated percentage correct versus percentage of false
positives for detecting motion changes during cued/microstimulated and uncued trials. Other conventions are the same as in D.
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tively as follows: because a highly trained monkey knows that on cued
trials any change will occur only at the cued location, it can ignore
uncued locations (nomatter howmany there are) and treat such trials
as if from a simple, binary choice 2-AFC or Yes/No task: did a change
happen at the cued location, or not? Since the type of trial (cued vs
uncued) is revealed to the animal well before the actual change occurs,
it is reasonable to posit that the animal adopts different choice criteria
for cued and uncued trials. Analytically, this can be demonstrated
with optimal decision theory: the prior odds ratio (and, hence, the
posterior odds ratio) of a change at an uncued location is zero. Hence,
the optimal criterion at the uncued location moves to the edge of
decision space (Fig. 6C), resulting in a large bias against responding to
uncued locations. In this case, the 2-ADC model is identical to a
2-AFC model [see Materials and Methods, Optimal two-alternative
detectionmodel for 100% valid cues is a two-alternative forced choice
(Yes-No) model] for deciding between two possibilities: change ver-
sus no change (catch trials) at the cued location.
For this task, the percentage of false positives (Fig. 6F ) were computed
as the percentage of incorrect responses to a locationwhenno change had
occurred at the location, regardless of whether a change had occurred at
another location, or nowhere (catch trials). This is identical to the per-
centage of incorrect Go responses on all trials, and differs from (but is
closely related to) our definition of false-alarm rates (Figs. 2–4), the
conditional probability of false-alarm (Go) responses during catch trials
alone. When matching the percentage of false positives between uncued
and cued trials (Fig. 6F ), false alarms on cued trials were modeled exclu-
sively as responses toward the cued location when no change occurred
anywhere.
We note a difference between the experimental task in the original
study (Cavanaugh andWurtz, 2004) and our simulated task: in the orig-
inal study, the change in the direction of motion could occur at one of
three patch locations. To simulate this, a 3-ADCmodel is required.How-
ever, the results of a 3-ADCmodel are not easily represented onpaper. To
simplify the representation of the results, and to highlight the essential
conceptual advance, we simulated a two-alternative version of the task
(Fig. 6A), in which changes in motion direction could occur at one of
only two patch locations, with a 2-ADC model. The behavioral effects
simulated with the 2-ADC task are a lower bound of the effects expected
with a task with multiple (3) alternatives. This can be intuitively un-
derstood as follows: the greater the number of alternatives in a task, the
greater the reduction in uncertainty (or improvement in certainty) about
the location of the upcoming target with a 100% valid cue (or with
microstimulation). Hence, the expected behavioral improvement arising
from a change in the decision rule (Fig. 6B,C) would be greater for a task
with a greater number of alternatives.
Simulation of the motion direction discrimination task with SC micro-
stimulation. For the perceptual discrimination task in Figure 7, directions
of motion of the target patch were equally distributed (50%) between
leftward and rightward motion, and across the two locations. Psycho-
physical functions describing the variation in sensitivity (d) with the
proportion of coherent dots weremodeledwith aNaka–Rushton (hyper-
bolic ratio) function of the following form: d  dmax (
n)/(n  50
n ),
where  the proportion of coherent dots was sampled in uniform, loga-
rithmically spaced bins from 10 to 100%, dmax is the asymptotic sensitiv-
ity, n is the exponent (slope) of the psychophysical function, and 50 is
the proportion of coherent dots at half-maximum sensitivity. For these
simulations, we used the following parameters: dmax 4.0, n 2.0 and
50 25%, although the results were fairly robust to the specific values of
these parameters.
The discrimination model for this task is elaborated in Materials and
Methods, Extension of the model to perceptual discrimination tasks. At
baseline, there is no spatial choice bias toward any location, so that c1
c2 1.5. Uponmicrostimulation, the choice criterion at themicrostimu-
lated location reduces symmetrically, by 20%, for both directions of mo-
tion (Fig. 7C; c1  1.2, c2 is unchanged). This magnitude of change in
criterion (20%) yielded a performance improvement (in percentage cor-
rect) of 6–8% for intermediate values of motion coherence (20–
50% coherence), which mimicked the performance improvement
obtained with SCmicrostimulation byMu¨ller et al. (2005) over a similar
range of target motion coherence (20–50%; Mu¨ller et al., 2005, their
Fig. 4b). For this task, percentage correct was computed as the propor-
tion of correct motion direction reports. The model was simulated with
these parameters to produce the psychometric functions shown in Figure
7D,E.
Simulation of the cued motion direction discrimination (filtering) task
with SC inactivation. For this task (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010), target
and foil stimuli were assumed to occur at one of two spatial locations
(Fig. 8A, top right, bottom left) with equal probability. The direction of
the motion of the cued (target) patch was equally distributed among one
of four potential directions of motion (45 and 135° from the hori-
zontal). The foil-patch motion could occur in any one of these four
directions, as long as it did not match the direction of target-patch mo-
tion on that trial; in Figure 8, an exemplar trial is shown in which the
target-patch motion is at45° and the foil-patch motion is at135°.
The discrimination model for this task is elaborated in Materials and
Methods, Extension of the model to filtering tasks involving perceptual
discrimination. In this model, we posit that sensory evidence for the
target-patch motion and that for the foil-patch motion are evaluated on
orthogonal axes. A key difference from the model for the previous task is
that, when the decision variable value falls below the criteria at both
locations (central gray zone), the animal indicates a location that is dif-
ferent from both the target and the foil location (“neither”).
For these simulations, the sensitivity (d) to the target patch (cued) was
taken to be 1.35 and that for the foil patch was taken to be 1.05. Tomodel
the animal’s bias to base its decisions upon the target’s sensory evidence,
we posited that the choice criterion for the target (ct 0.2) was substan-
tially lower than the choice criterion for foil (cf  1.4; Fig. 8B). Upon
inactivation of the SC representation at the target’s location, we posited
that that the values of these criteria reverse (ct 1.4 and cf 0.2; Fig. 8C).
Upon inactivation of the SC representation of the foil’s location, we
posited that the criteria further skews, relative to baseline, in favor of the
target (ct 0.14 and cf 6.0). The simulated proportions of the animal’s
choices regarding the direction of the target and foil patches (Fig. 8D,E,
squares) were derived from m-ADC model simulations based on these
parameter values. Tomodel the experimentally observed variation in the
proportion of these choices (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010), we repeated
these simulations 30 times. In each simulated run, the criteria and sensi-
tivities were selected randomly within a range 50 or 33% of their
mean values (given previously), respectively. The proportions of choices
from each simulated run are shown in Figure 8D,E.
Simulation of the cued motion direction change detection (filtering) task
with SC inactivation. For the “filtering” task in Figure 9, sensitivities (d
values) for motion change detection were assumed to be 2.0 at the cued
location and 1.0 at the uncued location. In this task, the animal reported
a binary Yes/No response (button press) without indicating the specific
location of perceived change. To capture this task design, we adopted a
slight variant of the 2-ADC decision rule: the animal was hypothesized to
provide a “Yes” response if the decision variable exceeded criterion at
either location, and a “No” response otherwise (Fig. 9A).
For this task, percentage correct (Fig. 9D–G) was computed as the
percentage of “Yes” responses for trials in which the change occurred at
the cued location, and error rates (percentage incorrect) were computed
as the percentage of “Yes” responses for trials in which the change oc-
curred at the uncued location. To quantitatively reproduce the experi-
mentally observed effect of SC inactivation (Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012),
we posited an increase in criterion (cinact  1.5) at the inactivated
location. The criterion at the noninactivated locationwas estimated from
the criterion at the inactivated location based on the false-alarm rate
(“Yes” responses) during catch trials. The effect of inactivation on the
choice criterion was assumed to be identical across cued and uncued
trials, so the same cinact was applied regardless of whether the inacti-
vated location was cued or uncued. Thus, a change in a single parameter,
cinact, was sufficient to capture the key behavioral effects of SC inacti-
vation (Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012).
8-ADC model fitting of the cued motion direction discrimination
(filtering) task with SC inactivation. This task (Lovejoy and Krauzlis,
2010) involved the simultaneous presentation of target motion and
foil motion patches, each moving in one of four directions, producing
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16 (4 4) potential stimulus combinations. However, on no trial did
the target and foil move in the same direction. Thus, only 12 target/
foil motion combinations were tested. Animals responded by indicat-
ing the direction of motion of the target patch with a saccade or
button press. This produced a 12  4 contingency table. Because the
animal made very few responses to directions other than those corre-
sponding to target or foil motion, we pooled these responses. Thus,
we analyzed a 12 3 contingency table corresponding to 12 stimulus
events and three response types: response indicating the direction of
target patch, the foil patch, or neither. We analyzed only the subset of
sessions in which target and foil stimuli were both presented, and only
those trials in which the stimuli contained a motion coherence of
0.1875 for subject F and 0.25 for subject M; in the original study, these
values were chosen to maintain performance at 65–70% for both
monkeys (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010, their Fig. 4).
We developed an 8-ADC model for fitting these data. In this model,
sensory evidence for each of the four directions of motion of the target
and the foil were represented by independent decision variables in an
eight-dimensional decision space. In principle, sensitivity (d) and crite-
rion (c) parameters could be estimated for each of the eight decision
variables (total of 16 parameters), because there are 24 independent con-
ditions in the contingency table. Tomake themodelmore parsimonious,
we estimated the d and c values for the targets, but included only one
parameter that modeled the ratio of the target to the foil sensitivity, and
one parameter that modeled the difference between criterion values for
targets and foils. In addition, because NoGo responses were not included
in this task, we fixed one of the criteria to a low value (3.0). This is
required because in a task with no NoGo responses, it is the difference of
criteria, rather than their absolute values that are relevant for model
fitting (for a detailed explanation, see Sridharan et al., 2014b, their sec-
tion F of Supporting Information). Here, the criterion for target direc-
tion 1 was set to this value, although the same results are expected
regardless of this specific choice. These assumptions reduced the overall
number of parameters to nine. Despite these simplifying assumptions,
the model provided good fits to data from both animals, as described in
the Results.
SC inactivation produced an additional set of two 12 3 contingency
tables: one corresponding to trials in which the target was presented in
the inactivated zone, and another for trials in which the foil was pre-
sented in the inactivated zone. SC inactivation could produce a response
Figure7. Bias effects in amotiondiscrimination taskuponmicrostimulationof theSC (Mu¨ller et al, 2005).A, A 2-AFCparadigm involvingadirectionofmotiondiscrimination judgment. Following
fixation, awide-field arrayof flickeringdotswaspresented.After a variableduration (575–1075ms), a small patchofdotsbegan tomove coherently inoneof twodirections (left vs right). Themotion
patchwas located, on interleaved trials, eitherwithin the receptive field of the SCneuronor in amirror symmetric locationabout the verticalmeridian. After abrief delay (150–750ms), two response
boxes appeared. The monkey was rewarded for indicating the direction of motion of the patch by saccading to the appropriate response box. The proportion of coherently moving dots was varied
among four values (12.5–100%) tomeasure the psychometric function. On interleaved trials, focalmicrostimulationwas delivered at the SC receptive field location.B, 2-ADCmodel for a perceptual
discrimination with NoGo responses. x-axis, Sensory evidence at location 1 (microstimulated location). Positive values indicate evidence in favor of rightward motion. Negative values indicate
evidence in favor of leftward motion. y-axis, Sensory evidence at location 2 (nonmicrostimulated location). Positive values indicate evidence in favor of leftward motion. Negative values indicate
evidence in favor of rightward motion. Thick lines, Decision boundaries parameterized by two choice criteria (c1 and c2; see C). Central gray zone, Region of decision space corresponding to NoGo
response. A Go response indicating rightwardmotion ismadewhen the sensory evidence falls in the lower-right half-plane and outside the NoGo decision region. Similarly, a Go response indicating
leftward motion is made when the sensory evidence falls in the upper-left half plane and outside the NoGo region. Dashed circles, Potential decision variable distributions. C, Same as in B, but
followingmicrostimulation of location 1. Thick lines, Decision boundary followingmicrostimulation of location 1, such that c1 decreases and c2 remains unchanged. The (default) decision boundary
with no microstimulation is also shown for reference (dashed gray lines). Red circles lie along the lines of equal strength of (conflicting) sensory evidence at the two locations. D, Simulated
psychometric function,which indicates percentage correct as a function of the proportion of coherent dots,with (black) orwithout (gray) SCmicrostimulation. Themicrostimulation sitewas aligned
with the location of the coherent motion. E, Same as in D, but with the microstimulation site away from the location of coherent motion. Other conventions are the same as in D.
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Figure 8. Bias effects in a cuedmotion direction discrimination (filtering) task upon inactivation of the SC (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010). A, A task paradigm involving discriminating the
direction of motion of a cued target patch in the presence of multiple distractors. Following fixation, a cue (red circle) indicated the location of the upcoming target. Following this, four
patches of random, incoherent dot motion appeared, one in each quadrant. Following this, the cue offset. At an unpredictable time, the target patch, and the patch in the diametrically
opposite location (foil patch) moved coherently in different directions for a brief period (160 ms). The monkey was rewarded for reporting the direction of motion of the target patch with
a saccade in that direction, while ignoring the direction of motion of the foil patch. B, 2-ADC model for perceptual discrimination in a filtering task. Dashed gray circle, Decision variable
distribution for stimuli at the target and foil locations. x-axis, Sensory evidence corresponding to the target-patch motion. For this example, positive values indicate evidence in favor of
motion toward the upper right, and negative values indicate evidence in favor of motion toward the lower left. y-axis, Sensory evidence corresponding to the foil-patch motion. Positive
and negative values indicate evidence in favor of motion toward the lower left and upper right, respectively. Thick green line, Decision boundary at baseline (before inactivation). Central
gray zone, Region of decision space corresponding to responses based on “neither” stimulus (neither target nor foil). Other conventions are the same as in Figure 7B. C, Same as in B, but
following SC inactivation. Thick solid blue line, Decision boundary following inactivation of the target location. The decision boundary before inactivation is shown for reference (dashed
green line). D, Simulated proportion of choices based on target motion direction (Correct, red), foil motion direction (Foil, yellow) or neither direction (Neither, gray) following
inactivation of the cued (target) location. Dots, Proportions obtained over n 30 simulated runs by introducing limited, random variations in sensitivities and criteria (see Materials and
Methods). Squares, Proportions based on mean values of sensitivities and criteria. E, Same as in D, but for inactivation of the foil location.
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bias against motion directions that require saccades into the inactivated
location (affected quadrant). To avoid the confounding effects of this re-
sponse bias in our analyses, we included trials in which neither the cued
signal nor the foil motion patches pointed into the affected quadrant, as in
the original study (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010). To model the effects of SC
inactivation, we extended the 8-ADCmodel to include three other parame-
ters: one that described the ratio of sensitivity at the inactivated location to
the preinactivation baseline (dIN/dPRE), one that described the ratio of sen-
sitivity at thenon-inactivated location to thepreinactivationbaseline (dOUT/
dPRE), and one that described the difference in criteria between the
inactivated location and the noninactivated location (cIN  cOUT); as dis-
cussed previously, for a task with no NoGo responses, the relative values,
rather than the absolute values of the criteria, are relevant for model fitting
(Sridharan et al., 2014b). We term this extended model the “8-ADC-inact”
model.With theoriginalnineparametersof the8-ADCmodel, and the three
additional parameters for modeling the effects of inactivation, the 8-ADC-
inact model incorporated 12 parameters.
We fit the entirety of the three 12  3 contingency tables with the
8-ADC-inact model. To limit the domain of parameter search, we im-
posed the constraints that sensitivity at the foil location could be no
higher than that at the target (cued) location and that the sensitivity at the
inactivated location could not be higher than sensitivity at baseline (dIN/
dPRE  1). MLE was used for parameter estimation, as described in the
Materials and Methods, Model fitting, with the difference that con-
strained optimization was employed here. Goodness-of-fit testing was
performed by pooling the contingency table across target and foilmotion
directions separately for each condition (preinactivation baseline, target
in the inactivation zone, and foil in the inactivation zone). Error bars for
the parameters (Fig. 10) were estimated based on a jackknife procedure
by leaving out one session at a time in the estimation.
To assess whether the primary outcome of SC inactivation was a
change in sensitivity versus a change in bias, we developed two other
models bymodifying the 8-ADC-inactmodel. In the firstmodel, 8-ADC-
inactsens-change, only sensitivities were allowed to change with inactiva-
tion, and criterion changes were not permitted (cIN cOUT cPRE). This
resulted in a 11-parameter model. On the other hand, in the second
model, 8-ADC-inactcrit-change, only criteria were allowed to change with
inactivation, and sensitivity changes were not permitted (dIN dOUT
Figure9. Bias effects in a cuedmotion-change detection (filtering) task upon inactivation of the SC (Ze´non andKrauzlis, 2012).A, A two-alternative paradigm involving the detection of a change
inmotion direction of a cued target stimulus in the presence of a foil stimulus. Following fixation, a cue (static dot patch) indicated the location of the upcoming target. Following this, two patches
of random dot motion appeared, one at the cued location (Target, red circle) and the other at the opposite location (Foil, yellow circle). At an unpredictable time, themotion direction of one of the
patches changed. Themonkeywas rewarded for reporting amotion direction change in the target stimuluswith a button push, and for ignoring changes that occurred in the foil stimulus.B, 2-ADC
model for change detection in a filtering task. Dashed black and gray circles, Decision variable distributions for changes at the target and foil locations, respectively. Thick green line, Decision
boundary at baseline (before inactivation). The boundaries partition decision space into three nonoverlapping domains. In two of the domains, the animal chooses to report a change (Yes); in the
third, it reports no change (No). C, Same as in B, but following SC inactivation. Thick solid blue line, Decision boundary following inactivation of the target location. Thin dashed blue line, Decision
boundary following inactivation of the foil location. The decision boundary before inactivation is shown for reference (dashed thin green line). Dot-dashed black line, Contour of choice criteria
corresponding to constant false-alarm rates during catch trials.D, Simulatedpercentage correct before (green) andduring (blue) inactivationwhen themotion changeoccurred at the target location
(red) and the target location was inactivated. E, Same as in D, but for inactivation of the foil location (yellow). F, Simulated error rates before and during simulated inactivation when the motion
change occurred at the foil location (yellow) and the foil location was inactivated. G, Same as in F, but for inactivation of the target location (red). D–G, Crossed arrows, Location of change. Circle,
Location of no change.
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dPRE). This resulted in a 10-parameter model.
Both models were fit with the same MLE pro-
cedure described above. Comparison of these
simpler models with the 8-ADC-inact model
was performed based on the AIC and BIC, as
described in Materials and Methods, Model
comparison.
Two-ADC model fitting of the cued motion
direction-change detection (filtering) task with
SC inactivation. The task (Ze´non and Krauzlis,
2012) involved detecting a change in either the
target or foil motion patches or indicating that
neither location changed, and the animals in-
dicated having detected a change with a button
press (Yes/No response). This produced a 3
2 stimulus–response contingency table. A full
3 3 contingency table was not obtained: the
animal’s report did not distinguish between
changes perceived at the target location and
changes perceived at the foil location. Hence,
behavior in this task could not be readily fit
with a 2-ADC model: whereas there are only
three independent observations in a 3 2 con-
tingency table, the 2-ADCmodel requires four
parameters—two sensitivities and two criteria,
one at each location—to be estimated.
Nevertheless, as with the previous task, SC
inactivation produced an additional set of two
3  2 contingency tables, one each for when
the target or foil was presented in the inacti-
vated zone, respectively. Thus, there were now
nine independent observations. We extended
the 2-ADCmodel by incorporating the follow-
ing additional four parameters: two parame-
ters for modeling the change in sensitivity at
the inactivated and noninactivated locations
relative to baseline (dIN/dPRE, dOUT/dPRE) and
two more parameters for modeling the change
in criteria following inactivation (cIN/cPRE,
cOUT/cPRE). We term this extended model the
“2-ADC-inact” model. This eight-parameter
model (four baseline parameters and four inactivation parameters)
could nowbe fit to the data from the three 3 2 contingency tables, taken
together.
As with the previous analysis, we fit two reduced models: a 2-ADC-
inactsens-change model, in which only sensitivities were allowed to change
following inactivation (cIN cOUT cPRE), and a 2-ADC-inactcrit-change
model, in which only criteria were allowed to change following inactiva-
tion (dIN dOUT dPRE). Both of these models had two fewer parame-
ters than the original 2-ADC-inact model.
Procedures for model fitting (ML parameter estimation), goodness-
of-fit testing, parameter error bars, and model comparisons were the
same as those for the 8-ADC-inact model, described above.
Results
Does the SC contribute to attention by altering perceptual sensi-
tivity, choice bias, or both?We develop the answer in three stages.
In the first section, we introduce a multidimensional signal-
detection model and explain how, in the model’s decision space,
performance changes indicative of changes in sensitivity can, in-
stead, be produced by changes in bias alone. In the second sec-
tion, we validate the model by showing that the model accurately
describes the behavior of animals engaged in different kinds of
visuospatial multialternative tasks. In addition, we show that the
model outperforms other candidate models in explaining behav-
ioral results in these tasks. In the third section, we re-examine
behavioral data from four seminal studies in the context of our
model to identify the precise nature of the effects of SC manipu-
lation (microstimulation or inactivation) on attention.
Amultidimensional model for decoupling perceptual
sensitivity from choice bias in multialternative tasks
Model description
We present a normative, signal-detection model that enables
quantifying sensitivity and bias from behavioral responses in
multialternative detection and change-detection (m-ADC) tasks.
In our m-ADC model, biases represent a preferential gating of
sensory evidence in the process of perceptual decision making.
These biases manifest in behavior as tendencies to favor certain
choices over others (Gold and Ding, 2013), and we term these
“choice biases.” These could arise from perceptual or decisional
processes (Mulder et al., 2012; Jogan and Stocker, 2014; Vintch
and Gardner, 2014; White and Poldrack, 2014). We distinguish
these from an alternative category of bias that can arise from
motoric processes associated with producing an overt response:
we term these “motoric response biases” (Garcia-Perez and
Alcala-Quintana, 2013). While our model makes it possible to
distinguish the contributions of choice bias from those of percep-
tual sensitivity, the contribution of motoric response biases can
be accounted for with an appropriate task design (Ze´non and
Krauzlis, 2012; García-Pe´rez and Alcala´-Quintana, 2013).
The m-ADC model applies to tasks that require a subject to
detect a target stimulus or a change in a target stimulus at one
Figure 10. mADCmodel parameters fit to SC inactivation data (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010; Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012). A, Top,
Differences in sensitivity between the target and foil locations before SC inactivation (green) and during inactivation of the target
(dark blue) or foil (light blue) spatial representations. Bottom, Differences in criteria between the target and foil locations. Other
conventions are the same as in the top panel. Left, Data for subject F. Right, Data for subject M. Parameter estimates are based on
fitting an 8-ADC-inact model to SC inactivation data from Lovejoy and Krauzlis (2010). Error bars denote SEs (jackknife) across
experimental sessions (n 7 for subject F; n 4 for subject M).B, Same as in A, but based on fitting an 2-ADC-inact model to SC
inactivation data from Ze´non and Krauzlis (2012). Data were pooled across subjects J and M (n 15 experimental sessions).
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among multiple possible locations (Fig. 1A,E) or to detect one
among multiple possible values of a stimulus feature (e.g., one
among several shapes or colors) at a given location. Consider, for
example, a two-alternative detection (2-ADC) task (Fig. 1A). The
2-ADC task involves reporting the appearance of a briefly pre-
sented target stimulus (positive contrast dot) that can appear at
one of two possible locations or not at all. The subject reports
detection of the target by making a saccadic eye movement to the
response box at the corresponding location. In each trial, one of
three stimulus events can occur (Fig. 1A, middle column): a tar-
get stimulus can be presented at location 1, at location 2, or not at
all (“catch” trial). For each stimulus event, there are three poten-
tial response types (Fig. 1A, right column): a response to location
1, to location 2, or maintain fixation. The first two responses are
termed “Go” responses, and the last is termed a “NoGo” re-
sponse. Conventionally, subjects are rewarded for making accu-
rate Go responses on stimulus trials, and for making NoGo
responses on catch trials (Cavanaugh and Wurtz, 2004; Cohen
and Maunsell, 2009; Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012; Steinmetz and
Moore, 2014). A task that incorporates a NoGo response is also
referred to as an unforced-choice task, or a nonforced-choice task
(García-Pe´rez and Alcala´-Quintana, 2011).
A previous m-ADCmodel was developed to analyze behavior
in such multialternative tasks that include catch trials and NoGo
responses (Sridharan et al., 2014b). However, the optimal deci-
sion strategy (decision rule) and definition of choice bias speci-
fied in the previous model were limited to scenarios in which
perceptual sensitivities to the various stimulus events (Fig. 1A,
targets at location 1 vs location 2) were equal. This condition is
frequently not satisfied, particularly in tasks that manipulate at-
tention, as for example with spatial cueing (Herrmann et al.,
2010; Carrasco, 2011; Sridharan et al., 2014a; Luo and Maunsell,
2015). Here, we extend the m-ADC model to incorporate an
optimal decision rule for this more general scenario in which
perceptual sensitivity to stimuli (or stimulus features) at different
locations can be significantly different, and, correspondingly,
generalize the definition of choice bias for such scenarios. Below,
we provide a verbal description and geometric intuition for the
model with a 2-ADC task. The mathematical formulation for the
general (multialternative) case is presented in Materials and
Methods.
SDT models perceptual decision making as an inherently
noisy process. For a binary choice task, such as a 2-AFC task,
decisions are based on the value of a univariate Gaussian random
variable, the “decision variable,” the mean of which depends on
the strength of the sensory evidence and the variance of which
arises from the noisiness of the sensory evidence across trials
(Green and Swets, 1988). The subject employs a cutoff (“crite-
rion”) value of the decision variable to decide between the two
competing hypotheses (e.g., stimulus at location 1 vs location 2).
For the 2-ADC task (Fig. 1A), on the other hand, wemodel the
decision variable as a bivariate Gaussian random variable,, in a
two-dimensional decision space (Fig. 1B). Each component of
the decision variable (1,2) encodes the strength of the sensory
evidence at each potential target location.We further assume that
the covariance matrix of the decision variable is an identity ma-
trix. Hence, the variance of along each dimension is unity, and
the two-decision variable components are uncorrelated and in-
dependent (see Materials and Methods, Eq. 1).
Whenno target stimulus is presented (as in catch trials), the
distribution is a unit variance Gaussian centered at the origin; we
denote this distribution as n (Fig. 1B, left). When a target stimu-
lus is presented at a location, the mean of the  distribution
increases for the decision variable component corresponding to
that location (Fig. 1B, center and right).We term the distribu-
tion for a stimulus at location 1 or 2 as s1 or s2, respectively. The
change in themean value of, measured in units of the standard
deviation of n, quantifies the perceptual sensitivity, di (d1 or d2),
for discriminating signal fromnoise (detecting a stimulus) at that
location. Neurally, enhanced sensitivity may be achieved by
mechanisms that enhance the gain of neural responses (Reynolds
et al., 2000; Williford and Maunsell, 2006; Sridharan and Knud-
sen, 2015) concomitantly with those that reduce neural noise and
variability (Mitchell et al., 2007; Churchland et al., 2010). Behav-
iorally, enhanced sensitivity at a location manifests as an en-
hanced ability to accurately detect the target stimulus at that
location.
In our model, linear (or, in general, planar) decision surfaces
partition the two-dimensional (multidimensional) decision
space into nonoverlapping domains (Fig. 1D, shaded; see Mate-
rials and Methods, Eq. 19). On each trial, a response is made to
the decision domain corresponding to the value of  on that
trial. In this 2-ADC model, the family of optimal decision sur-
faces in two-dimensional decision space represents the surfaces
of constant posterior odds ratio for each pair of alternatives (s1 vs
n, s2 vs n, and s1 vs s2; seeMaterials andMethods, Eqs. 11 and 16).
Because the joint probability distributions are Gaussians with
equal variance (circularly symmetric), the decision surfaces, rep-
resenting constant posterior odds, are straight lines. A family of
such optimal decision surfaces, corresponding to the distribu-
tions in Figure 1B, is shown in Figure 1C. In this formulation,
detection sensitivities need not be equal across locations (d1 d2;
Fig. 1B, middle vs right). These decision domains represent zones
in which the Bayesian posterior probability of each stimulus
event, given the sensory evidence, is greatest (see Materials and
Methods).
The family of optimal decision surfaces in the 2-ADCmodel is
parameterized by two choice criteria, c1 (s1 vs n family; Fig. 1C,
left) and c2 (s2 vs n family; Fig. 1C, middle). The third decision
surface is automatically determined by the intersection of the
other two surfaces and the relative values of d1 and d2 (s1 vs s2
family; Fig. 1C, right).
Themodel quantifies bias based on the relative values of these
choice criteria. Intuitively, the value of the criterion at a location
(relative to the other locations) is inversely related to the magni-
tude of the bias toward selecting that location. For example, de-
creasing the value of c1 results in a greater chance that location 1
is chosen for response, even on trials in which the strength of
sensory evidence (magnitude of1 and2) is identical across the
two locations (Fig. 1D, point marked X on diagonal line of1
2). This is equivalent to affording greater weight to sensory
evidence from location 1 in the final decision. Neurally, choice
bias toward a location may be achieved by increasing the gain of
synaptic input to the downstream neurons that read-out activity
at that location, although identifying neural mechanisms that
specifically alter choice bias remains an open question (Eckstein
et al., 2009). Behaviorally, choice bias for a location manifests as
an increased probability for selecting that location for decision
making and response.
The intuitive definition of choice bias, as being inversely re-
lated to choice criterion, is useful only when the sensitivities (d
values) at the two locations are equal. This is because the value of
the optimal choice criterion at a location depends on the sensi-
tivity to a stimulus at that location: in the absence of other influ-
ences, the optimal criterionwould lie at themidpoint of the signal
and noise distributions (cj  dj/2). In Materials and Methods,
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section titled “Relationship between choice criterion, choice bias,
priors, and payoffs”, we provide a definition of choice bias, based
on a likelihood ratio metric that discounts the contribution of
differential sensitivity. The resulting metric of choice bias re-
mains monotonically (inversely) related to choice criterion and
its numerical value depends on the difference between the actual
criterion and the optimal criterion estimated in the absence of
differences in priors or payoffs (see Materials and Methods, Eq.
28). We analytically demonstrate that, for optimal decisions
(those that seek to maximize success), this definition of choice
bias is directly related to the relativemagnitudes of the priors (the
prior probability of stimulus events) and the payoffs (the relative
costs/benefits for each stimulus–response contingency; see Ma-
terials and Methods, Eq. 28).
Figure 1D summarizes decision variable distributions and de-
cision surfaces for all 2-ADC stimulus and response contingen-
cies. For each stimulus event, the integral of in each decision
region represents the probability of choosing the response asso-
ciated with that region. In the Materials and Methods (Eqs. 23
and 24), we derive this analytical relationship, linking the re-
sponse probabilities for each stimulus event to the perceptual
sensitivity and choice criterion for the extended m-ADC model.
The effects of spatial cueing in a multialternative task
Studies seeking to understand the neural bases of spatial attention
have increasingly used multialternative tasks (Cavanaugh and
Wurtz, 2004; Cohen and Maunsell, 2009; Lovejoy and Krauzlis,
2010; Ze´non andKrauzlis, 2012; Steinmetz andMoore, 2014; Luo
andMaunsell, 2015). In these studies, the effects of attention or of
neural manipulations (microstimulation or inactivation) are
typically quantified as changes in percentage correct responses
(hits), changes in the percentage of incorrect responses (false
alarms), and/or changes in the slope of the psychometric func-
tion. An increase in percentage correct, decrease in false alarms,
and/or increase in the slope of the psychometric function in-
duced by cueing or microstimulation are commonly interpreted
as representing an improvement in the animal’s ability to detect
target stimuli (an improvement in perceptual sensitivity) at the
cued or microstimulated location. The converse effects (decrease
in percentage correct, increase in false alarms, or decrease in the
slope of the psychometric function) that result from inactivation
are assumed to represent an impairment in the animal’s ability to
detect targets (reduction of perceptual sensitivity) at the inacti-
vated location. Here we test the validity of these interpretations,
based on m-ADCmodel simulations and ideal observer analysis.
We consider a general class of task designs inwhich the animal
is cued to attend to one of multiple (2) potential target loca-
tions on every trial either explicitly, with a spatial cue, or implic-
itly, by increasing the probability of occurrence of the target
stimulus across a block of trials at one of the potential locations.
In both cases, the likely location of the target stimulus (or change)
is determined well before the target stimulus (or change) occurs.
A specific example of this class of tasks, an orientation-change
detection task, is shown in Figure 1E. In this task, the animal is
rewarded for correctly reporting a change in orientation of a
stimulus at any location (cued or uncued), and for not respond-
ing when no change occurs anywhere (catch). Similar task de-
signs have been widely used to measure the effect of attention on
neural information processing (Williford and Maunsell, 2006;
Cohen andMaunsell, 2009; Steinmetz andMoore, 2014; Luo and
Maunsell, 2015).
We simulated the animal’s behavior in this task with a 2-ADC
model. In our simulations, 90% of trials were change trials and
10%were catch trials, and changes were four timesmore likely to
occur at the cued location, mimicking the proportions employed
in the experimental studies (Williford and Maunsell, 2006; Co-
hen andMaunsell, 2009; Steinmetz andMoore, 2014). To test the
hypothesis that changes in sensitivity are not required to account
for changes in percentage correct performance, the modeled d
values for the two locations (cued, uncued) were held equal (see
Materials and Methods). In this way, changes in choice bias
can be directly estimated by comparing the values of the choice
criteria.
An ideal observer analysis maximized percentage correct
globally across all trial types (change and catch trials) with the
criteria (c1 and c2) as free parameters. To limit the number of free
parameters, we assumed that the animal maintained a constant,
low proportion of false alarms (0.1) on catch trials, a plausible
assumption for such tasks (see Materials and Methods).
The simulation results are shown in Figure 1F,G. To maxi-
mize percentage correct, the ideal observer analysis automatically
developed a bias toward the cued (high probability) location: the
criterion at the cued location (ccued  1.37) was about a third
lower than the criterion at the uncued location (cuncued 2.14).
We plotted percentage correct as function of the various simu-
lated d values at the cued and uncued locations (Fig. 1F). This
simulation mimics the experimental scenario in which target
stimuli of equal perceptual strength occur at the two locations.
The consequence of maximizing overall success was a consis-
tently higher percentage correct performance (by 30%) at the
cued, relative to the uncued location for identical values of d.
In addition, we plotted percentage correct as a function of
orientation-change magnitude assuming a hyperbolic ratio (Na-
ka–Rushton) relationship between perceptual sensitivity and
stimulus physical strength (here, change magnitude; see Materi-
als and Methods; Herrmann et al., 2010; Sridharan et al., 2014a).
The resulting psychometric performance curves showed a steeper
slope (for orientation changes from 1 to 10°) at the cued, relative
to the uncued locations (Fig. 1G).
These results demonstrate that, when data are gathered with
this kind of task design, a significant improvement in percentage
correct performance at the cued relative to the uncued location
does not necessarily indicate an increase in perceptual sensitivity,
and that changes in the slope of the psychometric performance
curve is an unreliable indicator for changes of perceptual sensi-
tivity. Rather, a change in choice bias alone is a robust strategy for
increasing percentage correct at the cued location. This example
highlights the importance of distinguishing bias from sensitivity
effects with normative models, such as the m-ADCmodel, in the
search for mechanisms by which attention influences neural in-
formation processing.
Describing and predicting behavioral results with the
m-ADC model
The m-ADC model, for multialternative tasks, is necessarily
more complex than one-dimensional binary choice signal-
detection models. We evaluated the ability of the model to
describe and predict behavioral responses measured in various
multialternative tasks: two detection tasks and an attention
task. These measurements were made in two classes of ani-
mals: birds (chickens, Gallus domesticus) and primates (ma-
caques, Macaca mulatta).
Four-alternative spatial target detection task
Chickens performed a four-alternative target detection task, in
which they had to detect and localize a brief target stimulus (pos-
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itive contrast dot) by pecking at its location in one of the four
quadrants of the visual field (Fig. 2A). In addition, if no target was
detected, the birds could give a NoGo response by pecking once
again on the zeroing cross (Sridharan et al., 2013).
In this task, the target was presented in 50% of the trials, with
equal probability of appearance at each location (12.5%), and
in the remaining 50% of the trials no target was presented (catch
trials). The data shown in Figure 2B document, for each contin-
gency (row), the number of responses made to each location
(columns 1–4) as well as NoGo responses (column 5, ; data
pooled across n  3 birds; 11,000 trials in 108 experimental
sessions). The diagonal entries of the contingency table represent
correct responses (hits and correct rejections) for that stimulus
event, whereas the off-diagonal terms represent incorrect re-
sponses (misses, false alarms, and mislocalizations; Sridharan et
al., 2014b).
Examining the relative proportions of correct responses (hits)
across locations revealed a substantially higher percentage cor-
rect for targets presented in the lower-left quadrant (location 3,
79% correct), relative to targets presented in the other quadrants
(42, 43, or 54% correct). Do these results indicate a higher
perceptual sensitivity to detect target stimuli in the lower-left
quadrant?
To answer this question, we fit the data from this task with the
m-ADCmodel. The data were well fit by the model (	12,10944

2 
7.11, pr  0.99, randomization test; MLE and Bayesian estima-
tion; see Materials and Methods). Furthermore, the estimation
procedure revealed that choice criteria were lowest for targets in
the lower hemifield (c3: 1.77 0.025; c4:1.90 0.029) compared
with those in the upper hemifield (c1: 2.80  0.074; c2: 2.73 
0.068; Fig. 2D, top; Table 1). These differences in choice criteria
manifested in behavior as a high proportion of incorrect (mislo-
calization) responses as well as false alarms on catch trials di-
rected to the lower hemifield locations (Fig. 2B, third and fourth
columns of the contingency table), relative to the upper hemifield
locations. Quantification of choice bias indicated a substantially
higher bias toward lower hemifield locations compared with the
upper hemifield locations (Table 2).
Having accounted for the choice biases, model estimates re-
vealed that sensitivity to target stimuli in the lower-left quadrant
(location 3: d3 2.58 0.05) was, in fact, no different from the
sensitivities to stimuli in the upper hemifield quadrants (d1 
2.62 0.08, d2 2.58 0.08; Fig. 2D, bottom; Table 1).
Next, we tested the ability of themodel to predict the animals’
behavior. We predicted response probabilities and counts for 17
contingencies (Fig. 2E, cells within highlighted square plus the
bottom right cell) based on model parameters estimated using
data from eight contingencies alone (misses and false alarms; Fig.
2B, last row and column of table). Predicted response probabili-
ties (Fig. 2E, cell shading) and counts (numbers within each cell)
closely matched the observed response probabilities and counts
(Fig. 2B) with a 2 goodness of fit of 2  6.61 (pr  0.99). In
addition, parameters estimated with this subset of data closely
matched the estimates obtained by fitting the full contingency
table.
Data from each bird analyzed separately were also fit well by
the model (Table 3), and parameter estimates indicated that
choice criteria were generally lower for the bottom hemifield
quadrants (Fig. 2F). Finally, predicted response probabilities
closely matched observed response probabilities when data were
analyzed separately for each bird (Fig. 2G; Table 3).
The results indicate that, despite its simplifying assumptions,
the m-ADCmodel accurately accounted for the observed behav-
ioral data in this four-alternative target detection task.
In this task, the animals reported the occurrence of a target
stimulus at a location with an overt movement (peck) toward the
same (respective) location. Hence, it is possible that a motoric
response bias toward the bottom hemifield targets contributed to
these asymmetries, although the provision for a NoGo (unde-
cided) response substantially reduces the chances of conflating
response bias with choice bias, as has been demonstrated previ-
ously (García-Pe´rez and Alcala´-Quintana, 2011, 2013; Sridharan
et al., 2014b).
Four-alternative, orientation-change detection task
A monkey performed a four-alternative, orientation-change de-
tection task that involved detecting and localizing a change in
orientation of one of four grating stimuli presented in each of the
four visual quadrants (Fig. 3A); the taskwasmademore demand-
ing by the introduction of a blank period before change events
(change blindness). A key difference from the previous task was
in the response protocol: the animal reported the location of
changewith an antisaccade, a saccadic eyemovement to the stim-
ulus diagonally opposite to the location of change. This task de-
signmakes it possible to distinguish the effects of spatial attention
at a location from those related to saccade preparation (Steinmetz
and Moore, 2014).
The considerable difficulty of the task (change blindness)
and the complex response rule (antisaccade) resulted in a high
proportion of incorrect responses (Table 4), even for large
orientation changes (Fig. 3G; change magnitudes, 90°).
With these “lapse rates” incorporated (see Materials and
Methods), the m-ADC model fit and predicted the monkey’s
behavior accurately.
Parameters estimated by pooling trials across all orientation
change magnitudes (10–90°; Fig. 3B; n  22 experimental ses-
sions) revealed that choice criteria (Fig. 3C, top) and choice bi-
ases (Table 6) were not different across locations.With sensitivity
and criterion parameters estimated using data from only 8 of 25
contingencies (misses and false alarms; Fig. 3B, last row and col-
umn of table), the model was able to predict responses (counts
and probabilities) for the remaining 17 contingencies accurately
Table 2. Model fits and parameters for
4-ADC target detection task: MLEs of bias
(pooled data)
MLE (mean SE)
b1 0.0200.009
b2 0.0240.011
b3 0.2890.068
b4 0.1670.039
Location1:upperright,2:upper left,3: lower left,4: lowerright.
Table 3. Model fits (goodness-of-fit statistics) for the target detection task, for
individual birds
Bird identity
All contingencies 8 of 25 contingencies
2 pr(
2) 2 pr(
2)
Bird 1 14.90 0.717 19.18 0.467
Bird 2 24.14 0.234 98.10 (11.52) 0.002* (0.99)
Bird 3 11.01 0.945 14.68 0.786
*2 Values formodel fits are inflatedwhen several cells in the contingency table contain low (5) response counts,
resulting in apparently poor fits (small p). 2 Statistics and p values computed with aggregated counts across
nontarget locations for each stimulus contingency (see Materials and Methods) produced acceptable fits (values in
parentheses).
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(Fig. 3D,E, highlighted square; 	12,5416

2  25.97, pr 0.17, ran-
domization test).
Next, we estimated psychophysical functions by estimating
sensitivities for nonoverlapping bins of orientation change mag-
nitudes, based on the miss rates for each orientation change bin
and the overall false-alarm rates (Fig. 3F; seeMaterials andMeth-
ods). Psychometric functions of percentage correct (hits) and
incorrect responses (misidentifications) predicted by them-ADC
model (Fig. 3G, inverted triangles) closely matched experimen-
tally observed psychometric functions across all orientation
change values (Fig. 3G, filled circles).
Thus, as before, the m-ADC model accurately accounted for
the observed behavioral data in this four-alternative change de-
tection task. The results indicated that, in this task, the monkey
did not exhibit a choice bias toward any specific location.
The multialternative tasks presented so far provided the sub-
jects with no prior information regarding the location of the
impending target stimulus. In visuospatial attention tasks, on the
other hand, the likely location of the target is indicated before-
hand with an informative spatial cue, which improves perfor-
mance by inducing a shift of attention to the cued location
(Carrasco, 2011). The relative contributions of sensitivity and
biasmechanisms to the effects of spatial cueing remain unknown.
We sought to answer this question with our m-ADC model.
Four-alternative, cued orientation-change detection task
The monkey performed the same orientation-change detection
task described in the previous section, except that on each trial a
cue (Fig. 4A, directed line segment close to fixation spot), indi-
cating the location of the upcoming change with93% validity,
appeared shortly after stimulus onset (Steinmetz and Moore,
2014). The superior task performance enabled by the cue obvi-
ated the need for accounting for lapse rates in this task (Table 5;
see Materials and Methods).
Estimates of sensitivities and criteria, based on behavioral re-
sponses pooled across cue locations (Fig. 4B; see Materials and
Methods) are shown in Table 7 and Figure 4C. The choice crite-
rion was lowest (cC, 0.13  0.020), and choice bias highest (bC,
1.477  0.293), for detection at the cued location. On the other
hand, the choice criterion was the highest (cR, 2.17 0.060) and
choice bias lowest (bR, 0.112 0.047) for detection at the diago-
nally opposite location. Criteria and biases were of intermediate
values at the other locations (bS, 0.427 0.157; bO, 0.330 0.138;
cS, 1.71 0.040; cO, 1.44 0.033). The results indicate a strong
cue-induced increase in choice bias relative to the uncued task
(compare Tables 6, 7; see Discussion). In addition, sensitivity
estimates (Fig. 4C, bottom) were nominally the highest at the
cued location and response location (dC, 1.02 0.05; dR, 1.60
0.19), relative to the other locations (dO, 0.87 0.18; dS, 0.82
0.20), although these differences were not significant.
As before, the model fit the monkey’s behavioral responses
accurately in this task (	12,4986

2  23.31, pr  0.28, randomiza-
tion test, n  12 experimental sessions). In addition, the model
Table 6. Model fits and parameter estimates
for uncued four-alternative orientation-
change detection task
Parameter MLE (mean SE)
Sensitivity d1 1.60 0.19
d2 0.87 0.18
d3 1.02 0.05
d4 0.82 0.20
Criterion c1 2.17 0.06
c2 1.71 0.04
c3 0.13 0.02
c4 1.44 0.03
Bias b1 0.310 0.072
b2 0.357 0.080
b3 0.343 0.077
b4 0.278 0.066
Location 1, Upper right; location 2, upper left; location 3,
lower left; location 4, lower right.
Table 7. Model fits and parameter estimates
for cued four-alternative orientation-
change detection task
Parameter MLE (mean SE)
Sensitivity dR1.600.19
dO0.87 0.18
dC1.02 0.05
dS0.82 0.20
Criterion cR2.170.06
cO1.71 0.04
cC0.13 0.02
cS1.44 0.03
Bias bR0.1120.047
bO0.330 0.138
bC1.477 0.293
bS0.427 0.157
C, Cued location; R, location opposite cued location; S, same
hemifield as cued location; O, diagonally opposite cued
location.
Table 8. Model fits (goodness-of-fit statistic) for individual cued positions
Cue location
All contingencies 8 of 25 contingencies
2 pr(
2) 2 pr(
2)
Combined 23.31 0.28 29.30 0.093
Cue: location 1 29.08 (4.96) 0.127 (0.99) 79.96 (31.51) 0.003* (0.99)
Cue: location 2 17.45 (0.29) 0.618 (0.99) 21.11 (2.15) 0.395 (0.99)
Cue: location 3 56.29 (7.51) 0.007* (0.99) 83.32 (22.74) 0.000* (0.99)
Cue: location 4 18.39 (0.95) 0.555 (0.99) 25.99 (6.44) 0.208 (0.99)
*Poor fits due to inflated2 values. Values in parentheses,2 Statistic and p values computed with counts aggre-
gated across no-change response locations for each stimulus contingency (see Table 3, Materials and Methods).
Table 4. APmatrix for uncued orientation change detection task
Change (C)
Response (R)
1 2 3 4
1 0.000b 0.143 0.714a 0.143
2 0.038 0.019b 0.057 0.887a
3 0.931a 0.035 0.000b 0.035
4 0.050 0.775a 0.175 0.000b
Each entry corresponds to the proportion of Go responses at a location R (columns) when a salient change (largest
rotation magnitudes, 70–90°, and the shortest flash durations,200 ms) were presented at location C.
aProportion correct (hit rates), corresponding to proportion of Go responses to the location opposite to change
(antisaccade task).
bProportion of Go responses to change location. The lowprobabilities in the other entries indicated that themonkey
had learned the antisaccade rule, but some confusion persisted when reporting the change, indicated by the re-
sponses to the locations adjacent to the response location (italicized cells).
Table 5. APmatrix for cued orientation change detection task (100% valid cues)
Change (C)
Response (R)
1 2 3 4
1 0.005 0.065 0.859a 0.071
2 0.045 0.000 0.045 0.910a
3 0.921a 0.052 0.000 0.026
4 0.039 0.945a 0.006 0.011
aUpon cueing (100%valid), asymptotic performance (for themost salient changes, as above) improved significantly
(90% correct, on average). Other conventions are the same as in Table 4.
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was able to accurately predict the monkey’s responses to both
validly and invalidly cued locationswith parameters derived from
only the misses and false alarms (Fig. 4D; 2 29.30, pr 0.093,
randomization test). The model continued to both fit (Table 8)
and predict (Fig. 4E) responses robustly when data for each cue
location were considered separately.
We asked whether, in this task, themonkey adjusted its choice
criterion at the cued location (Fig. 4C) following a rational deci-
sion policy. As shown in Materials and Methods (Eq. 28), the
optimal value of choice bias varies with the prior odds ratio of a
change at a location versus no change (pX/p0). In both the uncued
(Fig. 3A) and the cued (Fig. 4A) tasks, the probabilities of no
change on any trial (p0) were identical (50%). Thus, any differ-
ence in decisional policy (pX) between the cued and uncued tasks
would reflect a difference in prior probabilities of change between
these tasks. In the uncued change detection task, changes were
equally likely (25%) at all locations. Thus, the conditional prob-
ability of change at any location pX-UC, was 0.25. Themonkey did
not show a bias toward any particular location, and choice crite-
ria (Fig. 3C) and biases were similar across locations (Table 6;
medianbUC, 0.327).On theotherhand, in the cuedchangedetection
task (Fig. 4A), 93%of changes occurred at the cued location (pX-C
0.93). For optimal behavior, the value of the choice bias at the cued
location (Table 7) should reflect the change in the prior odds ratio
across the two tasks. Indeed, the choice bias at the cued location
estimated from the animal’s behaviorwith them-ADCmodel (bC
1.48) was numerically similar to that estimated from optimal deci-
sion analysis (bUC (pX-C/pX-UC)1.22). Thus, them-ADCmodel
analysis indicated a rational, albeit slightly suboptimal, shift in the
animal’s choice bias favoring the cued location.
The results demonstrate the ability of the model to explain
and predict behavior in this spatial cueing task. The model re-
vealed that, with spatial cueing, the monkey developed a strong,
near-optimal bias to report changes at the cued location. Having
controlled for these bias effects, the model provided an interest-
ing insight: the animal’s sensitivity (Fig. 4C, bottom) was numer-
ically highest at the location of the impending saccade, indicating
that although the animal was cued to attend to one location, the
planning of a motor response to the opposite location may have
caused some shift of attention to that opposite location.
Comparison of the m-ADC model with other candidate models
With eight parameters (one sensitivity and one criterion for each
of the four locations) the 4-ADC model was able to accurately
describe behavior in each of these tasks. Can a simpler model,
with fewer parameters, explain the data equally well? Alterna-
tively, do more complex models, with additional parameters, ex-
plain the data better?
We compared 4-ADC model fits against those of three other
candidate models (Fig. 5): (1) a five-parameter 4-ADC eq crit
model, a signal-detectionmodel that assumes equal criterion val-
ues at all locations (Fig. 5C,D; Macmillan and Creelman, 2005);
(2) a five-parameter 4-ADC eq sens model, a signal-detection
model that incorporates unequal criteria, but assumes equal sen-
sitivity values at all locations (Fig. 5E,F); and (3) a nine-
parameter 5-AFC model that treats NoGo responses as a distinct
category of Go responses (Fig. 5G,H; Macmillan and Creelman,
2005). Each of these models was tested for its ability to fit re-
sponses from the four-alternative target detection task (chickens;
Fig. 2A) and the four-alternative, cued orientation-change detec-
tion task (monkey; Fig. 4A). We did not attempt to fit the data
from the four-alternative orientation-change detection task
(monkey; Fig. 3A) because of the additional complexity involved
with modeling lapse rates for this task.
The models differed widely in their ability to fit the behavioral
data (Tables 9, 10). The 4-ADC and 5-AFC models could success-
fully account for responses inboth tasks (2 goodness-of-fit statistic,
randomization test; Tables 9, 10). On the other hand, the 4-ADC eq
crit and 4-ADC eq sens models could not account for responses in
either task (randomization test). However, for both tasks, the
4-ADCeq sensmodel accounted for theobservationsbetter than the
4-ADCeqcritmodel; because these twomodels have the samenum-
ber of parameters, the model with a lower AIC value indicates a
better fit.
Could these differences in ability to fit the behavioral data
arise from overfitting by the more complex models due to the
additional free parameters? To address this question, we com-
pared the relative performances of the models with two informa-
tionmetrics that penalizemore complexmodels: the BIC and the
AIC; the BIC penalizes more severely for the number of parame-
ters (Materials and Methods).
For the target detection task, the 4-ADC model yielded the
lowest AIC and BIC values (Table 9). Thus, for this task the
4-ADCmodel provided the best balance of complexity and good-
ness of fit. Again, for the cued orientation-change detection task,
the 4-ADC model yielded the lowest AIC and BIC scores (Table
10) among the models that fit the data; although the 4-ADC eq
sens model had the lowest AIC value, it did not fit these data per
the randomization test, as mentioned above. Absolute and rela-
tive values of sensitivity and criteria were similar among the
4-ADC and 5-AFCmodels for both tasks (Fig. 5A,B,E–H), dem-
onstrating that the more parsimonious 4-ADC model was suffi-
cient to provide reliable estimates of these parameters.
In summary, the results indicate that the 4-ADC model pro-
vided the best trade-off between complexity and goodness of fit
when compared with simpler (4-ADC eq crit, 4-ADC eq sens) or
more complex (5-AFC)models. Incorporating differences in cri-
teria into themodel was essential to fit, and to correctly interpret,
responses in these multialternative tasks: a model that incorpo-
rated differences in criteria but with equal sensitivities accounted
for the observations better than a model with equal criteria but
different sensitivities, indicating that differences in criteria were
important for explaining the observed differences in perfor-
mance across locations.
Table 9. Model comparison based on AIC and BIC: four-alternative target detection
task (chickens)
Model np df 
2 pr(p2) AIC BIC AIC BIC
4ADC 8 12 7.11 0.99 (0.85) 12222 12280 0 0
4ADC eq crit 5 15 415.7 0.00 (0.00) 12693 12730 471 450
4ADC eq sens 5 15 111.04 0.00 (0.00) 12318 12354 96 74
5AFC 9 11 16.22 0.69 (0.13) 12229 12295 7 15
np, Number of parameters; df, degrees of freedom; pr, p value (randomization test); p2, p value 
2 test; AIC,
AIC AICmin ;BIC, BIC BICmin.
Table 10. Model comparison based on AIC and BIC: four-alternative cued
orientation-change detection task (monkey)
Model np df 
2 pr(p2) AIC BIC AIC BIC
4ADC 8 12 23.31 0.28 (0.03) 9422 9474 0 0
4-ADC eq crit 5 15 3864.6 0.00 (0.00) 12625 12658 3203 3184
4-ADC eq sens 5 15 33.73 0.04 (0.00) 9425 9458 3 16
5AFC 9 11 21.09 0.40 (0.03) 9425 9484 3 10
Conventions are as in Table 9.
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Themechanistic role of the SC in spatial attention as revealed
by the m-ADC model
Having established the parsimony and validity of the m-ADC
model, we applied the model to published behavioral data from
four studies that tested the effects of either microstimulation or
inactivation of the SC on attention-demanding tasks (Cavanaugh
andWurtz, 2004; Mu¨ller et al., 2005; Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010;
Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012). We sought to determine whether the
reported effects (namely, changes in percentage correct and/or
false-alarm rates) could have been produced by changes in choice
bias (decision strategies) alone without changes in the animal’s
perceptual sensitivity (d).
The effects of SC microstimulation in a spatial, change
detection task
The first of the four studies that we considered employed a
“change blindness” motion direction-change detection task
(Fig. 6; Cavanaugh andWurtz, 2004). In this task, either a spatial
cue was presented or focal microstimulation was delivered on
some trials, but not on others. The cue was presented well before
(1–2 s) the motion direction change occurred, and was fully
informative (100% valid) about the location of the upcoming
change. Similarly, focal microstimulation of the SCwas delivered
well before (450 ms) the motion direction change occurred:
although the microstimulation was subthreshold for evoking
movement, its effects could provide the animal with advance
information indicating, with 100% validity, the location of
change. The blanking of the screen (Fig. 6A) served a temporal
cue, thereby eliminating temporal uncertainty associated with
the onset of the motion direction change (in the original study,
data from trials without blanks were eliminated from the
analyses).
The effect of the cue or microstimulation was evaluated based
on differences in performance between cued and uncued trials,
with performance quantified as percentage correct and percent-
age false-positive responses. The percentage of correct responses
(hits) was based on the proportion of trials inwhich a saccadewas
made to the location of change as a fraction of the number of
trials in which a change occurred in any one of the patches, and
the percentage of false positives was based on the proportion of
trials in which a saccade was made to a location at which no
change had occurred, regardless of whether a change had oc-
curred anywhere else or nowhere (catch). The percentages of false
alarms during catch trials and change trials, respectively, were not
reported separately. An increase in percentage correct responses
on cued (relative to uncued) trials, accompanied by no change, or
a reduction, in percentage false-positive responses, was taken as
evidence that shifting attention to the cued location counters
“change blindness” (Cavanaugh andWurtz, 2004, their Figs. 2A,
3A). Quantitatively similar increases in percentage correct were
observed when the SC was microstimulated (Cavanaugh and
Wurtz, 2004, their Fig. 4B). Hence, it has been inferred that mi-
crostimulating the SC produces an effect similar to that of a cued
shift of attention.
Before we present our simulation results, we note a difference
between the experimental task and our simulated task. In the origi-
nal study (Cavanaugh andWurtz, 2004), the change in the direction
of motion could occur at one of three patch locations, which we
could have simulated with a 3-ADCmodel. To simplify the presen-
tationof the results, however,we simulateda two-alternative version
of the task (Fig. 6A), in which changes in motion direction could
occur at one of only two patch locations, with a 2-ADCmodel. The
essential conclusions remain the same, regardless of the number of
potential change locations (seeMaterials andMethods).
In the simulated task, changes occurredwith equal probability
(50%) at each of the two locations on uncued change trials,
whereas all changes (100%) occurred at the cued/microstimu-
lated location on cued/microstimulated change trials. The pro-
portions of trials were also the same as in the original study (65%
change and 35% catch trials; Cavanaugh and Wurtz, 2004). To
reduce the number of free parameters in the model, we assumed
a constant proportion of false alarms on catch trials (0.2). As in
the previous example, d values for target stimuli at both locations
and for both cued and uncued trials were held equal.
Figure 6D–F (open symbols) shows the results of ideal ob-
server analysis for uncued/nonmicrostimulated trials analyzed
with the 2-ADC model (Fig. 6B). Because the number of change
trials and the distribution of d values were identical across loca-
tions, the ideal observer analysis selected a symmetric decision
rule with no differences in criteria across locations. The maxi-
mum percentage correct (with an average false-positive rate of
11%) increased monotonically with the d value (Fig. 6D, open
circles) and with the magnitude of motion direction change (Fig.
6E, open circles).
Next, we simulated the animal’s behavior on the trials with
cueing ormicrostimulation.Wematched the percentage of false-
positive responses across cued/microstimulated versus uncued
trials (Fig. 6F; seeMaterials andMethods). Ideal observer analysis
of cued/microstimulated trials yielded a model with a high bias
toward the cued/microstimulated location and away from the
uncued/other locations (Fig. 6C; seeMaterials andMethods, sec-
tion titled “Optimal two-alternative detection model for 100%
valid cues is a two-alternative forced choice (Yes-No) model”).
Simulated behavioral results revealed that for identical d values
and similar false-positive rates across cued/microstimulated and
uncued/other locations, percentage correct performance was
consistently greater on cued/microstimulated trials than on un-
cued/other trials (Fig. 6D,E, closed vs open circles).
Thus, the effects of spatial cueing, as well as those of SC mi-
crostimulation, on task performance could be entirely accounted
for by changes in choice bias (including a potential oculomotor
response bias) alone without involving changes in perceptual
sensitivity.
The effects of SC microstimulation in a perceptual
discrimination task
The second of the four studies employed a two-alternative per-
ceptual discrimination task in which monkeys had to report
(with a saccadic eye movement) the direction of motion (left vs
right) of a patch of coherently moving dots (Mu¨ller et al., 2005).
In each experimental session, the moving patch could occur at
one of two potential locations symmetrically distributed about
the vertical meridian (Fig. 7A). This study demonstrated that
electrical microstimulation applied at the target’s spatial repre-
sentation in the SC improves percentage correct in this task. This
improvement has been interpreted as demonstrating a causal role
for the SC in covert spatial attention (Mu¨ller et al., 2005).
Unlike the previously discussed detection paradigm (Cavanaugh
andWurtz, 2004), this study employed a forced-choice discrimina-
tion paradigm. Such a paradigmprovides an unbiased estimation of
the effects of microstimulation on performance, because the spatial
microstimulation carries with it no information regarding the cor-
rect behavioral response (leftward vs rightward motion), thereby
eliminating the contribution of oculomotor response biases to the
observed effects on task performance. Nevertheless, could the mi-
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crostimulation have induced a spatial choice bias that resulted in the
improvement in percentage correct?
To answer this question, we employed a variant of the 2-ADC
model for discrimination tasks. The analytical development of the
model specifically adapted for this task is presented inMaterials and
Methods, section titled “Extension of the model to perceptual dis-
crimination tasks.” In this model, the decision to respond to one of
the directions ofmotion is based on sensory evidence at both poten-
tial target locations.Hence, in contrast to the one-dimensional deci-
sion space of the conventional 2-AFC model (Macmillan and
Creelman,2005), the subject’s decision in the2-ADCdiscrimination
task ismodeled ina two-dimensionaldecision space (Fig. 7B). In this
model, the subject gives a Go response indicating themotion direc-
tion with the greatest strength of sensory evidence. However, if the
sensory evidence formotion in either direction falls below the crite-
ria at both locations (Fig. 7B,C, gray zone), the subject gives aNoGo
response, indicatingno target detected anywhere. In the latter case, if
the subject were forced to choose one of the two directions (as in the
task inMu¨ller et al., 2005),we posit that the subjectwould “guess” at
each of the two directions with equal probability (50%), with no
response bias for either direction.
First, we simulated the 2-ADC model for the case without
microstimulation. As before, the model produced a monotonic
improvement in percentage correct with the strength of motion
coherence in the target patch (proportion of coherent dots; Fig.
7D,E, gray). In these simulations, the criterion values were equal
at both locations (c1 c2 1.5).
Next, we simulated the effect of microstimulation as a 20%
decrease in the value of the criterion at the microstimulated lo-
cation (Fig. 7C); an identical decrease was applied symmetrically
across the axis, implying that the microstimulation did not bias
any particular direction of motion. Nevertheless, this configura-
tion resulted in a spatial choice bias favoring themicrostimulated
location for both directions of motion. In this case, when sensory
evidence at both locations was of equal strength, but indicated
conflicting directions (Fig. 7C, red circles), the monkey would be
more likely (biased) tomake a choice based on the evidence at the
microstimulated location. The effect is a shift in bias that prefer-
entially gates sensory evidence at the microstimulated location.
Model simulations produced results strikingly similar to the
observed effects of SC microstimulation in this study (Fig. 7D,
black vs gray; compare with Mu¨ller et al., 2005, their Fig. 4a):
increased percentage correct and a shift in the psychometric
function toward lower target strengths resulting in a lower psy-
chophysical threshold (strength of coherent motion to achieve a
performance level of 82% correct; Mu¨ller et al., 2005). On the
other hand, there was little change in the psychometric function
at the opposite (nonmicrostimulated) location (Fig. 7E; compare
with Mu¨ller et al., 2005, their Fig. 4b), as observed in the original
study. Thus, again, the experimentally observed effects of SCmi-
crostimulation could be explained entirely by changes in spatial
choice bias alone.
The effects of SC inactivation in a spatially cued perceptual
discrimination (filtering) task
The third studywe considered employed a task inwhichmonkeys
had to detect a change in a cued stimulus in the presence of a
similar foil stimulus, a task referred to as a “filtering task” (Fig.
8A). In such filtering tasks,multiple stimuli are presented on each
trial, and the animal is cued beforehand to attend to the location
of one of the stimuli (target). The animal is rewarded for accu-
rately discriminating a feature (e.g., motion direction) of the
cued target stimulus while ignoring the foil (distractor) stimuli.
The task in this study (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010) involved
the presentation of four patches of randomlymoving dots, one in
each quadrant of the visual field, with one of the four patches
cued as the target patch (Fig. 8A). Following a brief delay, the
cued (target) patch and the diametrically opposite uncued (foil)
patch moved coherently for a brief period (160 ms). The animal
was rewarded for making a saccade in the direction indicated by
the target motion patch, while ignoring the motion of the foil
patch. The effect of SC inactivation was measured in terms of
changes in proportion of responses based on the target versus
foil-patch motion direction.
Lovejoy andKrauzlis discovered that upon inactivating the SC
representation at the cued (target) location, the animals re-
spondedmore frequently based on the direction indicated by the
foil stimulus (20% before inactivation to70% after inactiva-
tion; Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010, their Fig. 4a,c). However, the
proportion of “neither” responses, in which the animal’s re-
sponsewas based onneither target nor foilmotion did not change
upon inactivation, indicating that the change in behavior was not
simply a result of the animal guessing more frequently. In addi-
tion, inactivation of the SC representation corresponding to the
foil location produced a complementary effect such that the an-
imals based their decision on targetmotion evenmore frequently
than at baseline (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010, their Fig. 4b,d).
We simulated this task with a model for discrimination tasks
adapted for such filtering tasks (Fig. 8B; see Materials and Meth-
ods, Extension of themodel to filtering tasks involving perceptual
discrimination). We posited that cueing a location for attention
would produce a greater sensitivity at the cued (target) location
relative to the foil location (dtarget  1.35; dfoil  1.05). Sensory
evidence from the target was biased in the decision by setting the
choice criterion for the target stimulus (ct  0.2) to be substan-
tially (7) lower than the criterion for the foil location (cf 1.4;
Fig. 8B). We further proposed that when sensory evidence was
weak at both locations (Fig. 8B, central gray zone), the animal
would indicate a location that was different from both the target
and the foil locations (“neither”). Finally, we modeled the effect
of SC inactivation of the cued (target) location by reversing the
relative magnitudes of the criteria at the target and foil locations
(Fig. 8C); sensitivity was assumed to remain unaltered.
The results of simulating the model produced the same pat-
tern of effects, both qualitative and quantitative, compared with
the reported effects of SC inactivation of the cued location (Love-
joy and Krauzlis, 2010): the proportion of choices based on the
foil, initially at 23% increased to 67%, whereas the propor-
tion of choices based on the target fell to 28% from 72%, with the
proportion of “neither” responses remaining unchanged at
5%. Again, simulating the effect of inactivating the foil location
produced precisely the same complementary effect as observed
experimentally, with a slight increase in the proportion of choices
based on the target (89%), and a decrease in the proportion of
choices based on the foil (6%), again with no change in the pro-
portion of “neither” responses. Thus, the precise pattern of ef-
fects in a cued discrimination task following SC inactivation
could be readily replicated in ourmodel framework by changes of
choice bias alone (Krauzlis et al., 2013).
The effects of SC inactivation in a spatially cued, change detection
(filtering) task
The final studywe considered employed a filtering task, similar to
the one described previously, except that the animal is rewarded
for detecting and reporting a change in the cued stimulus (tar-
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get), and for ignoring any changes in uncued, foil stimuli (Ze´non
and Krauzlis, 2012).
In the task in this study (Fig. 9A), the presentation of a spatial
cue was followed by two motion stimuli (moving dot patches),
one at the cued location (target) and the other at the diagonally
opposite location (foil). The animal was rewarded for reporting a
change in the target’s motion direction by pushing a button
(“Yes”) and for abstaining from responding (“No”) when the
change occurred at the foil location (Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012).
Task performance following SC inactivation was measured in
terms of changes in percentage correct (hit rates: percentage of
correctly reported Yes responses to changes in the target stimu-
lus) and percentage incorrect (error rates: percentage of incor-
rectly reported Yes responses to changes in the foil stimulus). The
percentage of false alarms (Yes responses on catch trials) was not
reported.
This study demonstrated that when a target stimulus was
presented inside the SC inactivated zone, the monkey rarely
reported direction changes in the target stimulus, resulting in
a dramatic decrease in percentage correct performance (Ze´-
non and Krauzlis, 2012, their Fig. 1c, top left). At the same
time, changes in the foil stimulus were reported more fre-
quently, corresponding to an increase in error rates (Ze´non
and Krauzlis, 2012, their Fig. 1c, bottom right). In contrast,
when the target stimulus was presented outside the inactivated
zone, performance was not different from the preinactivation
baseline (Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012, their Fig. 1c, top right and
bottom left). The button-press protocol in this task design
excluded the contribution of any oculomotor response biases
to the effects on task performance.
We simulated this filtering taskwith a 2-ADCmodel (Fig. 9B).
To account for the ability of the monkey to perform this task
before SC inactivation, we hypothesized that cueing increased the
monkey’s perceptual sensitivity for detecting motion direction
changes at the cued location (dtarget 2.0; see Discussion) com-
pared with at the foil location (dfoil 1.0); the specific choice of d
values did not alter the results. Next, to simulate the 70% hit
rates and the 5% error rates measured before inactivation, we
chose, respectively, an intermediate value of the criterion at the
target location (ctarget 1.5) and a high criterion at the foil loca-
tion (cfoil  3.0). As before, we assumed that the animal main-
tained a constant, low percentage of false alarms during catch
trials (7%); the conclusions were robust to variations in these
specific parameter values (see Materials and Methods).
We employed this model to explore the effects of changes in
choice bias, as might be caused by SC inactivation. Specifically,
we hypothesized that SC inactivation shifts the animal’s choice
bias away from the inactivated location.Wemodeled this shift by
increasing the criterion at the inactivated location by cinact 
1.5, to match the observed reduction in percentage correct with
inactivation. Figure 9C depicts the 2-ADC model of this
inactivation-induced bias effect (blue): the criterion at the inac-
tivated location was increased and the criterion at the noninacti-
vated location was decreased, so that performance traveled along
the contour of constant false-alarm rate (Fig. 9C, dot-dashed
black curve; see Materials and Methods, Eq. 25).
Simulating this model produced results strikingly similar to the
observedeffectsof SC inactivationonbehavioralperformance.All of
the effects on hit rates (percentage correct) and error rates (percent-
age incorrect) to the target and foil stimuli (four independent effects;
Fig. 9D–G; compare with Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012, their Fig. 1c)
were accurately reproduced by increasing the single free parameter,
cinact, which simulates a change in choice bias away from the inac-
tivated location (Fig. 9C).
The results are consistent, once again, with the hypothesis
that, rather than affecting perceptual sensitivity (d), inactivating
the SC resulted in a change in choice bias away from the inacti-
vated region.
m-ADC model analysis of SC inactivation studies
We have shown, thus far, that the effects of SC manipulation
(microstimulation or inactivation) can be entirely accounted for
by changes in choice bias alone, indicating that the SC acts pre-
dominantly by controlling the choice bias for attended locations.
These results were based on simulating the m-ADCmodel with a
fixed set of parameters. We sought to confirm these findings by
fitting the m-ADC model to behavioral data from the last two
seminal SC inactivation studies (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010; Ze´-
non and Krauzlis, 2012).
First we analyzed the SC inactivation study involving motion
direction discrimination (Fig. 8A; Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010).
The task in this study involved the simultaneous presentation of
target and foil motion patches, each moving in one of four direc-
tions, although motion directions for the target and foil patch
were never identical (Fig. 8A). Animals responded indicating the
direction of motion of the target patch (with a saccade or button
press). Each response could correspond to the direction of target-
patch motion, foil-patch motion, or neither (three response
types). The 12 stimulus event types and three response types
resulted in a 12 3 contingency table. In the simulations (Fig. 8),
we had modeled only a pair of motion directions to illustrate the
effect of a change in choice bias. Here we fit these data with a fully
descriptive 8-ADC model. The model represented evidence for
each of the four directions of motion at the target and foil loca-
tions along each axis of an eight-dimensional decision space (see
Materials and Methods).
SC inactivation produced two more 12  3 contingency ta-
bles, corresponding to trials in which targets or foils, respectively,
were presented at the inactivated location. We modeled the en-
tirety of these three 12  3 contingency tables by extending the
8-ADC model to incorporate three additional parameters:
changes in sensitivities at inactivated locations, changes in sensi-
tivities at noninactivated locations, and changes in criterion at the
noninactivated location relative to the inactivated location (see
Materials and Methods). We term this model the 8-ADC-inact
model. To avoid the effects of induced motoric biases, we only
included trials in which neither the cued target nor the foil mo-
tion patches pointed into the inactivated quadrant.
The 8-ADC-inact model provided a good fit to the monkeys’
behavior both before and after inactivation (responses pooled
acrossmotion directions,	6,3687

2  12.07, pr 0.062 formonkey
F, and 	6,1593

2  2.09, pr 0.915 for monkey M randomization
test; see Materials and Methods). Before inactivation, sensitivity
at the foil location was closely similar to that at the target location
(dF/dT  0.93 for monkey F and 0.99 for monkey M). On the
other hand, the criterion for foil-based decisions was consistently
higher than for target-based decisions in both animals (cF cT
0.9 for monkey F, and 0.81 for monkey M). Following SC inacti-
vation, the model indicated that sensitivity marginally decreased
at the inactivated location (dIN/dPRE  0.65 for monkey F and
0.75 for monkey M), and was relatively unaltered or marginally
increased at the noninactivated location (dOUT/dPRE  0.94 for
monkey F and 1.21 for monkey M). Moreover, the criterion for
decisions based onmotion at the inactivated location was consis-
tently greater than the criterion for decisions based on motion at
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the noninactivated location for both animals (cIN cOUT 1.12
for monkey F and 1.17 for monkey M). In Figure 10, we plot the
effects of SC inactivation on the difference between the sensitiv-
ities, and the difference between the criteria, at the target and foil
locations for both animals (monkey F and monkey M). These
results indicate that SC inactivation produced consistent effects
on sensitivities and criteria in both animals. Moreover, for both
animals, criterion differences were dramatically reversed (rever-
sal of bias) following inactivation of the attended target’s repre-
sentation in the SC (Fig. 10A, bottom, green vs dark blue).
We next asked which of these effects of SC inactivation—
those on sensitivity, on criteria, or both—could best account for
the observed behavioral data. To answer this question, we com-
puted the AIC and BIC metrics for the original model (the
8-ADC-inact model) as well as two adaptations of the 8-ADC-
inact model: one that modeled only changes in sensitivity with
inactivation (8-ADC-inactsens-change), and one that modeled only
changes in criteria with inactivation (8-ADC-inactcrit-change). In
each monkey, and regardless of the choice of measure (AIC or
BIC), the 8-ADC-inactcrit-change model outperformed the
8-ADC-inactsens-change model (Table 11; AIC  11.71,
BIC  17.91 for monkey F; AIC  0.94, BIC  6.19
for monkey M). Even when we included in the comparisons the
full 8-ADC-inact model that incorporated both sensitivity and
criterion changes with inactivation, the 8-ADC-inactcrit-change
model exhibited lower BIC values consistently across the two
monkeys (Table 11). These results indicate that criterion changes,
as compared with sensitivity changes, better account for the be-
havioral effects of SC inactivation. These criterion changes rep-
resent a shift in choice bias away from the inactivated location
(see Materials and Methods, Eq. 27).
Next, we analyzed the SC inactivation study involvingmotion
change detection (Zenon and Krauzlis, 2012). This study re-
quired the animal to detect a change in the direction ofmotion of
a target patch and ignore changes in motion in a foil patch pre-
sented concurrently. Changes could occur in the target patch, foil
patch, or neither, and the animals responded with a Yes (change
in target patch) or No (no change in target patch) response, re-
sulting in a 3  2 contingency table. A 2-ADC model does not
suffice to model behavior in this task (see Materials and Meth-
ods). However, the SC inactivation produced two other 3  2
contingency tables, one when the target was presented in the
inactivated location and one when the foil was in the inactivated
location. As before, we modeled the entirety of these three 3 2
tables by extending the 2-ADC model with four parameters: (1)
change in sensitivity at the inactivated location, (2) change in
sensitivity at the noninactivated location, (3) change in criterion
at the inactivated location, and (4) change in criterion at the
noninactivated location (the explanation for four additional pa-
rameters vs three in the previous case is given in Materials and
Methods). We term this model the 2-ADC-inact model. Because
the task design did not distinguish correct rejections based on
perceived foil motion from those based on no change, we pooled
these model responses in the fitting procedure. As the data from
monkeys J andMwere highly similar (Ze´non andKrauzlis, 2012),
data from these animals were combined for this analysis.
Again, the 2-ADC-inact model provided a good fit to the be-
havioral data, both before and after SC inactivation (	4,6306

2 
11.65, pr 0.23, randomization test; seeMaterials andMethods).
Before inactivation, sensitivity at the target and foil locations
were not different (dF dT 2.64), whereas the criterion at the
foil location was 1.8 times higher than at the target location (cF
2.33, cT 4.24). Following SC inactivation, the model indicated
that sensitivity wasmarginally reduced at the inactivated location
relative to preinactivation baseline (dIN/dPRE  0.66) and was
relatively unaltered at the noninactivated location (dOUT/dPRE
0.88). In addition, the criterion for decisions based on changes at
the inactivated location increased relative to preinactivation
baseline (cIN/cPRE  1.22), whereas the criterion for decisions
based on changes at the noninactivated location decreased rela-
tive to baseline (cOUT/cPRE 0.74). These results are fully concor-
dant with those obtained in the previous analysis based on the
Lovejoy and Krauzlis (2010) dataset (Fig. 10A,B).
As before, we performed model comparisons by computing
AIC and BIC metrics for the 2-ADC-inact model (the original
model), a 2-ADC-inactsens-change model that modeled only
changes in sensitivity with inactivation, and a 2-ADC-inactcrit-
change model that modeled only changes in criteria with inactiva-
tion. Fully in line with the results of the previous analysis, the
2-ADC-inactcrit-change model outperformed the 2-ADC-inactsens-
changemodel regardless of the choice of comparisonmeasure (AIC
or BIC; Table 12; AIC39.32, BIC39.33). As before,
in comparison with the full 2-ADC-inact model, the 2-ADC-
inactcrit-change model exhibited lower BIC values (Table 12).
These convergent results across two completely different ex-
perimental datasets strongly suggest that the predominant con-
sequence of SC inactivation is to change the choice criterion in a
space-specific manner. Changes in the choice criterion, in turn,
indicate that the SC biases the gating of sensory information into
decision-making networks at the attended location (see Discus-
sion; Fig. 11). In addition, the results demonstrate the utility and
power of ourm-ADCmodeling framework for distinguishing the
effects of sensitivity from those of choice bias in such multialter-
native experiments.
Discussion
Multialternative task designs are increasingly used in animal
studies that seek to identify the neural bases of cognitive pro-
cesses, including selective attention (Cavanaugh and Wurtz,
2004; Williford and Maunsell, 2006; Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010;
Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012; Sridharan et al., 2013; Steinmetz and
Moore, 2014) and decision making (Churchland et al., 2008;
Niwa and Ditterich, 2008; Ditterich, 2010; Churchland and Dit-
terich, 2012). The m-ADC model, developed and validated here
with behavioral data, provides a principled framework for ana-
Table 11. Model comparison for SC inactivation data in a cued, motion direction
discrimination task (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010)
Model np
Monkey F Monkey M
AIC BIC AIC BIC
8-ADC-inact 12 5369.68a 5444.14 2592.30a 2656.59
8-ADC-inact sens-change 11 5389.73 5458.00 2595.64 2654.58
8-ADC-inact crit-change 10 5378.02 5440.09a 2594.70 2648.29a
np, Number of parameters.
aModel with the lowest AIC or BIC value.
Table 12. Model comparison for SC inactivation data in a cued, motion change
detection task (Zénon and Krauzlis, 2012)
Model np AIC BIC
2-ADC-inact 8 4999.82a 5053.79
2-ADC-inact sens-change 6 5042.33 5082.82
2-ADC-inact crit-change 6 5003.01 5043.49a
Conventions are as in Table 11.
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lyzing and interpreting data collected in such multialternative
task designs.
Applying our model to published results from multialterna-
tive tasks provided important insights into how the SC controls
spatial attention. The analyses revealed that the SC contributes to
attention, predominantly through mechanisms that alter spatial
choice bias, which is produced by differential control of choice
criteria at attended versus unattended locations.
Fundamental components of choice bias
At least two components of task design influence choice bias: (1)
the prior probability (“priors”) of each stimulus event, and (2)
the magnitude of reward (“payoffs”) for a correct response for
each stimulus event. Each of these has been manipulated in pre-
vious studies to induce choice bias in perceptual decision tasks
(Mulder et al., 2012; Vintch andGardner, 2014). From aBayesian
view of decision making, priors and payoffs are optimally com-
bined to maximize success during task performance (Green and
Swets, 1988; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). Our model formalizes the
relationship among Bayesian priors, payoffs, and choice criteria
and biases in multialternative tasks (see Materials and Methods,
Eqs. 26–28).
Application of the m-ADC model to behavioral results re-
vealed the existence of two kinds of spatial bias. Chickens exhib-
ited an innate bias for targets (small dots) in the lower visual
hemifield. This bias likely reflects the significantly higher chance
of encountering rewarding stimuli (food items) in the lower ver-
sus the upper visual field when they search the ground for food
(Sridharan et al., 2013). The monkey exhibited a bias, associated
with a near-optimal criterion shift that was induced by a highly
informative spatial cue. This bias reflects a learned expectation
that is expressed only in the context of the task. Thus, these biases
may reflect Bayesian priors that arise from adaptation to the sta-
tistics of the environment over various timescales. Rather than
treating these biases as a nuisance that must be trained away, our
model quantifies such biases and, thereby, enables deciphering
the complex relationship between an animal’s perception and its
behavior (Carandini and Churchland, 2013).
Assumptions and extensions of the m-ADC framework
The m-ADC framework incorporates simplifying assumptions,
including uncorrelated noise distributions and stationarity of the
noise variance (across trials). In addition, it does not distinguish
between external and internal noise (Lu and Dosher, 1998) and
does not explicitly model response bias. Notice that these as-
sumptions impose certain constraints on the kinds of responses
that can be modeled with the mADC framework. For example,
the assumption of uncorrelated noise implies that the probability
of a false alarm for a particular response type (indicating response
r1 when no stimulus was presented), can never be less than the
probability of misidentification (indicating response r1 when
stimulus type s2 was presented). Despite these assumptions, our
parsimonious model provided an excellent fit to behavioral data
from different kinds of animals across a wide range of experi-
ments, and it consistently outperformed other candidatemodels.
The model may be readily extended to incorporate additional
structure both in the decision variables and decision rule. For
instance, correlations between the noise distributions can be
modeled by altering the covariancematrix C of decision variables
(see Materials and Methods, Eq. 1), so that C is no longer a
diagonal matrix, but also incorporates off-diagonal terms. In this
case, the optimal decision rulewould have to be updated based on
statistical decision theory (Eckstein et al., 2009), and is likely to
involve quadratic decision surfaces (unlike the simpler, linear
decision surfaces of them-ADCmodel). Similarly, nonstationar-
ity of the variance of the noise distribution (across trials) could be
modeled by considering the distribution of the noise variance as
an additional parameter of the model. Were signal and noise
variance to scale unequally (for example, if the internal noise
variance covaried with signal strength), the decision variable axis
would no longer be monotonically related to the log-likelihood
ratio of the hypothesis, and the optimal decision strategy would
involve a muchmore complex decision rule involving more than
one cutoff criterion per decision axis (Sridharan et al., 2014b;
Cabrera et al., 2015). In addition, the model can be extended to
incorporate motoric response bias by including, for each re-
sponse type, an additional multiplicative parameter whose value
scales with themagnitude of the bias for that response. Generally,
such amodelmust be accompanied by an appropriate task design
for distinguishing response bias from choice bias (Garcia-Perez
and Alcala-Quintana, 2013; Sridharan et al., 2014b). For exam-
ple, for the tasks shown in Figure 4 or 8, such an extended model
has the potential to decouple choice bias from response bias, as
the choice ismade based on sensory evidence from a location that
is distinct from the location of the response.
Neural mechanisms of attention: sensitivity or bias?
Our results are highly relevant to resolving a fundamental ques-
tion regarding the neurobiology of attention (Carrasco, 2011): do
improvements in behavioral performance at the attended loca-
tion reflect the action of neural mechanisms that enhance the
quality of sensory information at the attended location (percep-
Figure 11. A schema for how sensitivity and biasmechanisms in the forebrain andmidbrain
interact to control visual spatial attention. Sensitivity (blue) and bias (red) mechanisms act
along parallel, convergent neural pathways to enhance performance in spatial attention tasks.
Cueing a location engages top-down mechanisms (e.g., from the frontoparietal network) that
selectively enhance neural sensitivity to sensory evidence at the cued location (blue arrow). The
enhancement is manifest in neural encoding in the visual cortex. At the same time, neural
signals from the SC bias particular spatial locations by giving sensory evidence from these
locations the greatestweight (red arrow). The SC spatial bias influences the animal’s perceptual
decisionsby selectively gating (up/downweighting) the sensory evidence fromdifferent spatial
locations to the decision process (evidence accumulator). Typically, the location of enhanced
sensitivity (blue) and the location biased by the SC (red) are the same. The distinct contribution
of each mechanism is revealed by experimental manipulations (such as SC stimulation or inac-
tivation) that cause these mechanisms to favor different spatial locations, as shown in this
schema.
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tual sensitivity), those that selectively gate sensory evidence at the
attended location (choice bias), or both?
Analysis of behavior in the spatial cueing task (Fig. 4) with
the m-ADCmodel yielded preliminary insights into this ques-
tion. The monkey’s perceptual sensitivity was marginally but
reliably higher at two locations—the spatially cued location
(C) and the location of the impending saccade (R)—indicat-
ing that the animal was dividing its attention between the cue
and response locations. On the other hand, choice criteria
were lowest for changes at the cued location and highest for
changes at the response location. These results indicate that
spatial attention can induce changes in bias, sensitivity, or
both, and that mechanisms that alter choice criterion and bias
can be dissociated from those that alter perceptual sensitivity.
These observations resonate with a recent proposal: perfor-
mance improvements in attention tasks can arise from
changes in the animal’s decision policies (bias) regardless of
changes of sensitivity (Krauzlis et al., 2014).
Moreover, whenwe simulated the effects of attentional cueing
with the m-ADC model (Figs. 1E–G, 6B–F), we found that
changes in choice bias (decision rule) could result in exactly the
same pattern of changes in hit, error, and false-alarm rates, or
changes in the slope of the psychometric function that are rou-
tinely assumed to represent changes in perceptual sensitivity
when analyzed with conventional one-dimensional models. The
results urge caution when inferring changes in sensitivity based
on these conventional behavioral metrics alone (Eckstein et al.,
2013). Although in some cases the location of greatest biasmay be
directly inferred from the pattern of false-alarm and miss rates
(Figs. 2B, 4B), the m-ADC model permits quantifying the mag-
nitude of this bias for multialternative behavioral data. In addi-
tion, the m-ADC model fit behavioral data in multialternative
tasks better and more parsimoniously (Tables 9, 10) than alter-
native candidate models. By quantifying the distinct contribu-
tions of bias and sensitivity to behavioral data, the parsimonious
framework of the m-ADC model provides a valuable tool for
identifying underlying neural mechanisms of selective attention.
Role of the SC in visuospatial attention
Simulations with the m-ADC model provided important insights
into the contribution of the SC to spatial attention. The behavioral
effects of microstimulation or inactivation of the SC, from four im-
portant studies, were quantitatively reproduced by the model with
changes in spatial choice bias alone, and fitting themodel to behav-
ioral data independently confirmed these findings. In addition to
our results, converging evidence from the original studies indicate
that, in each case, the behavioral effects of SCmanipulationwerenot
due to changes in perceptual sensitivity.
In the first study (Cavanaugh and Wurtz, 2004), additional
behavioral evidence confirmed the spatial choice bias effects of
SC microstimulation. Had the microstimulation improved per-
ceptual sensitivity without altering choice criteria, false-positive
rates should have been unchanged at the microstimulated loca-
tion. A geometric intuition for this result is obtained by translat-
ing the decision variable distribution for a stimulus at one
location (the microstimulated location) further from the origin,
without concurrently moving the decision surfaces in Figure 6B.
On the other hand, the data from this study overwhelmingly
indicated that in experiments in which SC microstimulation in-
creased percentage correct (hits) significantly, false-positive rates
were also increased (in five of six experiments; Cavanaugh and
Wurtz, 2004, their Fig. 5A,B). These results are consistent with a
selective effect of SC microstimulation on increasing spatial
choice bias toward the microstimulated location.
The second study (Mu¨ller et al., 2005) used an elegant, forced-
choice design involving a motion-direction discrimination task. In
this task, the location of SC microstimulation could not have pro-
vided the animal with information regarding the correct answer
(motion direction). Nevertheless, when analyzed with a 2-ADC
model (a two-dimensional model), the effects of SC microstimula-
tion were accurately accounted for by an increase in spatial choice
bias toward themicrostimulated location.On theother hand, a con-
ventional (one-dimensional) 2-AFC model would predict that the
shift in the psychometric function represented an improvement in
perceptual sensitivity. Which interpretation is correct?
Attentional enhancement of perceptual sensitivity is thought
to operate by differential allocation of limited perceptual re-
sources (Eckstein et al., 2009; Carrasco, 2011). In the study of
Mu¨ller et al. (2005), while percentage correct performance in-
creased at the SC microstimulated location, no concomitant
decrease in percentage correct occurred at the opposite (nonmi-
crostimulated) location. Had SC microstimulation increased
performance by enhancing perceptual sensitivity at a location,
the limited resources theory predicts that performance should
have deteriorated at the other location. The lack of such an effect
(Mu¨ller et al., 2005, their Fig. 4b) is consistent with our proposal
that SC microstimulation induced a choice bias toward the mi-
crostimulated location (Fig. 7C). Further experiments incorpo-
rating an unforced-choice design (with a NoGo response) could
distinguish between these interpretations.
The third and fourth studies (Lovejoy and Krauzlis, 2010;
Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012) demonstrated that SC inactivation of
the target’s sensory representation resulted in a detriment to be-
havioral performance because the animal based its decisions on
sensory information from the foil.
Analysis of both of these studies with our m-ADC model
framework indicated a highly convergent pattern of results (Fig.
10). Themain difference was that cT cF became positive follow-
ing inactivation in one case (Fig. 10A), but not in the other. This
was perhaps due to its much larger negative value (cT cF, high
choice bias toward the target) even during the preinactivation
baseline in the second study (Fig. 10B), although the extent of
criterionmodulation remained about the same across the studies.
Our model comparison analysis (Tables 11, 12) demon-
strated that, in both studies, the effects of SC inactivation
could be best accounted for by a model that incorporated only
changes in criteria, rather than only changes in sensitivity.
Furthermore, the model that incorporated criterion changes
alone also outperformed the full model that incorporated both
changes in criterion and sensitivity. These results indicate that
the predominant effect of SC inactivation is a change in choice
bias. This conclusion is consistent with observations by Love-
joy and Krauzlis (2010): they reported that when no foil was
presented, and the target was presented by itself, the animal
did not show appreciable performance deficits, suggesting that sen-
sitivity at the inactivated location was relatively unimpaired.
The fourth study (Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012) provided
neurophysiological evidence that is also consistent with our
findings. This study measured the effects of spatial cueing on
behavioral detection of motion change and, simultaneously,
on neural activity in a visual cortical area (MT). The results
demonstrated that, with SC inactivation, behavioral perfor-
mance plummeted at the cued location while the neural sig-
natures associated with improved sensory encoding for that
location were unaffected.
Sridharan et al. •Mechanistic Role of the Midbrain in Attention J. Neurosci., January 18, 2017 • 37(3):480–511 • 509
These apparently paradoxical findings are readily explained
within the parsimonious framework of our m-ADC model (Fig.
9B,C). In this framework (Fig. 11), the SC contributes to im-
proved behavioral performance, specifically, by enhancing spa-
tial choice bias. Neural signals from the SC improve performance
at a particular spatial location by giving sensory evidence from
that location greater weight (Fig. 11, red). Such SC-biased sen-
sory evidence dominates the animal’s perceptual decisions by
selectively gating (up/down weighting) sensory evidence, and
acts downstream of forebrain sensitivity enhancement mecha-
nisms (Fig. 11, blue). Consequently, the effects of SC inactivation
are explained by a choice bias (criterion shift) away from the
inactivated location (Fig. 9C) without affecting sensitivity to sen-
sory information in the forebrain.
Our model provides a framework for gaining a mechanistic
understanding of the contribution of the midbrain network to
selective spatial attention from the analysis of behavioral data
(Fig. 11). This framework also explains other previous reports of
attention deficits following SC lesions. For example, viewed from
the perspective of this framework, reported effects of spatial
hemineglect that appear following SC lesions (Dean and Red-
grave, 1984a,b; Overton et al., 1985; Midgley et al., 1988) repre-
sent the effects of severe spatial choice bias that accompanies SC
lesions. Our framework also offers a parsimonious explanation
for the so-called “Sprague effect,” the observation that the hemi-
nanopsia that results from a unilateral lesion of the visual cortex
is greatly diminished by the removal of the contralateral SC. Ac-
cording to our schema (Fig. 11), removal of the contralateral SC
causes a powerful spatial choice bias that blocks sensory informa-
tion from the normal hemifield and enhances information from
the previously anoptic hemifield (Sprague, 1966).
Our findings demonstrate the need for careful experimen-
tal designs for distinguishing perceptual sensitivity from
choice bias in attention tasks. Our model and framework will
find important application in teasing apart the contribution of
various brain regions and circuits to these fundamental com-
ponents of attention.
Notes
Supplemental material for this article is available at http://cns.iisc.ac.in/
sridhar/publications.html. This material has not been peer reviewed.
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